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The term governance has undergone somewhat of an evolution since its inception,
originally describing the act of governing, it has come to represent a more collaborative form of
governing which is distinct from hierarchal control models (Marin and Mayntz, 1991).
Collaborative governance refers to the systems associated with public policy decision making
and resource management which span the jurisdictional boundaries of public agencies, levels of
government, and/or public and private spheres in order to pursue a public policy goal or outcome
(Emerson et al., 2012). Environmental management is often considered an inherently
collaborative effort, as ecological systems and species rarely fall neatly within political or other
human constructed boundaries (Bodin, 2017a).
Collaborative environmental governance systems can be a response to joint-jurisdictional
management, where multiple managing organizations have legal jurisdiction over a species or
system. This is often the case with species listed under the United Sates Endangered Species Act
(ESA). Collaborations can also aid in dealing with the challenges of operating in a resource
limited world. By forming collaborative governance structures, organizations aim to leverage

resources, expand knowledge of the system, and avoid working at cross-purposes (Emerson and
Nabatchi, 2015; Ulibarri and Scott, 2017). Whatever the original motivator, there are practical
challenges associated with implementing a collaborative governance structure. The success with
which environmental collaborative governance structures operate varies greatly (Emerson et al.,
2012).
Using the Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework (ASRF) as a mixed-methods case study,
we aim to further our understanding of communication, collaboration, institutional capacity for
change, and barriers and opportunities for collaboration through Communication Network
Analysis (CNA) and semi-structured interviews with members of the ASRF. The Gulf of Maine
(GOM) Distinct Population Segment of Atlantic salmon (DPS) is managed by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS), the Maine Department of Marine Resources (MDMR), and the Penobscot Nation
(PN). Individuals from these 4 organizations make up the ASRF, the current governance
structure for Atlantic salmon management and recovery in the state of Maine.
In chapter 2, we describe the theoretical frameworks, methods, results, and significant
implications of the CNA we conducted. 95% (N=41) of the individuals identified as members of
the ASRF (N=43) participated in an online sociometric survey. The sociometric survey asked
participants about their position within their organization and the ASRF, how long they have
worked in Atlantic salmon management and/or recovery, the frequency with which they
communicate with other members of the ASRF, and the productivity of those communications,
using open and close-ended questions. In chapter 3, we describe the theoretical frameworks,
methods, results, and significant implication of the semi-structured interviews we conducted.
68% (N=28) of individuals who were invited (N=41), participated in a semi-structured interview.

The semi-structured interviews focused on member perceptions of ASRF operations, procedures,
strengths, weaknesses, and power dynamics.
The CNA reveled that there is a high degree of communication occurring within the
ASRF, but that individuals are segregated into three distinct communities which align with
organizational boundaries. Organizational boundaries are not uncommon, however, the lack of
integration between organizations shows that members are not organizing based on ASRF
structure. The semi-structured interviews suggest that the lack of integration across organizations
could be due in part to members reporting issues associated with leadership, operational
transparency, lack of trust, and perceived differences in management styles and objectives. The
lack of leadership was evident in both the CNA and interview data. As the managing
organizations work to restructure the ASRF, the results and recommendations provided in this
thesis have served as a valuable tool in identifying strengths, weaknesses, institutional barriers,
and capacity of change.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
Introduction to Collaborative Governance
Environmental management is by nature a collaborative endeavor, as species and
ecosystems rarely align with political or other human-derived boundaries and demarcations
(Bodin, 2017). Over time the term governance has evolved, originally describing the act of
governing, it has come to describe a type of government that is more collaborative in nature and
distinct from traditional hierarchal models (Marin and Mayntz, 1991). There are many types of
governance structures which public and private governments and/or organizations may choose to
adopt. In natural resource management collaborative governance has become increasingly
common. Collaborative governance can be defined as the systems associated with public policy
decision making and resource management which span the jurisdictional boundaries of public
agencies, levels of government, and/or public and private spheres in order to pursue a public
policy goal or outcome (Emerson et al., 2012).
There are many reasons to adopt a collaborative governance approach to managing
environmental resources. We are of course living in a resource limited world, and as
governments, resource agencies, managers, and other stakeholders and organizations realize they
need more resources to accomplish their environmental goals they are collaborating with one
another in an attempt to leverage resources, access information, better understand available data,
and avoid redundant or counter-productive actions (Emerson et al., 2012). Joint-jurisdiction over
an individual species or system is another common reason for the adoption of collaborative
governance structures (Emery and Trist, 1965; Gray, 1985). One example is the listing of a
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species by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which can require joint jurisdiction of species
recovery, and at the minimum, collaboration between different federal and state government
organizations.
In the United States, fish and wildlife are owned by the people and managed as a public
trust for all current and future citizens. Generally, land and wildlife are managed at the state
level, however, when a species is deemed to be at imminent risk of extinction, the ESA
designates responsibility for management and recovery to one or more federal agencies. Under
the ESA federal agencies are required to cooperate with states to the maximum practicable extent
and to uphold United States Treaty Trust Responsibilities when management will impact tribal
resources (Endangered Species Act of 1973, As Amended through the 108th Congress, n.d.).
When federal, state, and tribal entities find themselves jurisdictionally responsible and
interested in the management and/or recovery of a single species, collaborative governance
structures can provide a platform for coordinating efforts for the betterment of the species
(Ulibarri and Scott, 2017). Despite the obvious theoretical benefits of collaborative governance
to overcome resource limitations and coordinate joint-jurisdictional management systems, the
efficacy with which collaborative governance structures operate varies greatly (Robins et al.,
2011).
Case Study: Atlantic Salmon in Maine
Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) populations have suffered dramatic declines over the past
several decades. Like other diadromous fish species, long migrations and habitat loss leave
Atlantic salmon vulnerable to population decline from dams, pollution, and over-exploitation
(USASAC, 2017). Maine is now the Southern limit of the Atlantic salmon’s range in the United
States, but salmon were once abundant in North America from Ungava Bay in Canada to Long
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Island Sound in the United States (Saunders et al., 2011). Today, Maine’s adult Atlantic salmon
returns are estimated to be just 1% of the historic abundance. Atlantic salmon are an anadromous
species that migrate long distances from natal headwater streams to oceanic adult feeding
grounds (NOAA, 2016).
Pre-Listing History of Management in Maine
When Maine was colonized by Europeans in the 1600’s and the timber industry moved
into the region, the landscape was greatly changed. Rivers were straightened to facilitate log
running, dams were established to regulated flow, and mills were constructed to process the
timber (Schmidtt 2015). These factors, which were later compounded by the widespread
adoption of hydroelectric power, meant that Atlantic salmon habitat was now fragmented,
contaminated, and largely inaccessible (Schmitt, 2015).
The first dam to span the entire width of the Penobscot river was constructed in Old
Town, Maine in the 1920’s, effectively reducing diadromous species access to hundreds of miles
of historically accessible habitat (Schmitt, 2015). During this time Atlantic salmon were also
being harvested commercially, recreationally, and for subsistence. Atlantic salmon from Maine
were considered a delicacy nationwide. In fact, “Penobscot salmon” were coveted and many
restaurants boasted of carrying these prized fish (Schmitt, 2015). In response to the high demand
of Atlantic salmon came a boom in commercial fishing operations and processing plants (e.g.
canneries). While this popularity was economically profitable it further compounded the stresses
acting upon the Maine Atlantic salmon population. By the 1860’s the native population could no
longer support industry demand in the face of declining habitat, and hatchery supplementation
programs soon emerged (Schmitt, 2015; Jenkins, 2003).
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The 1970’s saw an increase in species protections and environmental laws at a federal
level including the Rivers and Harbors Act (1970), the Clean Water Act (1972), the ESA (1973),
and the Magnuson-Stevens Act (1976). The first two made great strides toward reducing inland
pollution and increasing water quality, while the latter two provided the legal authority to ban
species take in all waters of the united states and established the U.S. Economic Exclusion Zone
(EEZ), allowing for the control of marine species within 200 miles of the United States coastline.
Likely a result of these policies in combination with favorable environmental conditions, the
Atlantic salmon returns to the United States doubled during the 1980’s (USASAC, 2017).
However, by 1990 marine survival decreased nearly 80%, thought to be the result of
international fishing practices (USASAC, 2017).
Federal Endangered Species Act Listing
Despite a long history of management efforts, by 1990 the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) were considering the
Gulf of Maine (GOM) Distinct Population Segment (DPS) of Atlantic salmon for protection
under the ESA. The State of Maine fought against ESA protection arguing that the GOM DPS
was not a genetically distinct population. In 1995, under Governor Angus King, a cooperative
arrangement was developed between industry, state and federal bureaucracies, and nongovernment environmental organizations (NGOs). The agreement included, i. provisions for
improved fish management techniques through the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and
Wildlife (MDIFW) and the Maine Department of Marine Resources (MDMR); ii. measures to
restore degraded habitat and ensure future habitat integrity; iii. the development of more
comprehensive salmon protection measures; iv. additional efforts related to public outreach and
education; and v. a plan to more effectively enforce existing regulations (Jenkins, 2003). By
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1999 Maine had spent one million dollars to implement the plan and earmarked an additional one
million dollars for continued efforts.
While the cooperative agreement was initially successful in preventing federal
intervention (NMFS et al., 2011), the GOM DPS was listed as endangered under the ESA in
December of 2000 with joint listing authority delegated to NOAA and USFWS. Initially
consisting of only the southern portions of State, the GOM DPS was extended in 2009 to include
the Penobscot and Denny’s river watersheds. The DPS is comprised of three geographically
distinct Salmon Habitat Recovery Units (SHRU); Merrymeeting Bay, Penobscot, and Downeast.

Figure 1.1. Map of Salmon Habitat Recovery Unit (SHRU) boundaries for the Gulf of Maine
Distinct Population Segment of Atlantic salmon.
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The Maine Technical Advisory Committee
From 1980 to 2005 managers, stakeholders, and citizens met as a single unit for Atlantic
salmon management decision making under the Maine Technical Advisory Committee (TAC).
Meetings were open to all interested parties and followed a dialogue and deliberation format.
However, decisions were ultimately made by the board, which was comprised of representatives
from the Atlantic Salmon Commission (which later merged with MDMR), the Maine
Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife (MDIFW), NMFS, and USFWS.
In 2004 the National Research Council (NRC) conducted a review of the GOM DPS
management practices and recommended that “recovery planning for the species adopt a
systematic, structured approach to making management decisions, focused on understanding
critical uncertainties and on developing strategies that address key sources of ecological risk.”
(NMFS et al., 2011, p. 3). Recommendations from this independent review process mirrored
managers complaints about “strained and, at times, litigious relationship[s]” between federal
agencies, the State, and affected industries (NMFS et al., 2011, p.3). The dissolution of TAC in
2005 resulted in years of diminished coordination between entities (NMFS et al., 2011), during
this time of increased uncertainty representative members of USFWS and NMFS sought training
in structured decision-making (Gregory et al. 2012), with the goal of developing a new
collaborative governance structure, which would address issues highlighted by staff members
and the NRC review.
The Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework
From 2005-2011, building from the structured decision-making training undertaken by
representatives of NMFS and USFWS, the federal agencies in conjunction with DMR and PIN
drafted the Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework (NMFS et al., 2011; Gregory et al., 2012). The
6

intent of this new collaborative governance structure was that it would be “built on a foundation
of agreement on the biological needs of the species, identification of objectives or a shared goal,
and actions to achieve that goal” (NMFS et al., 2011, p. 7).

Figure 1.2. Formal structure of the Atlantic Salmon Recovery with prescribed organizational
participation as described in the Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework unifying policy
document (NMFS et al., 2011).

The ASRF document (NMFS et al., 2011) outlines three basic levels, a Policy Board,
Management Board, and 7 Action Teams (Figure 1.2). The policy board is comprised of the
NMFS’ Regional Administrator (RA), the USFWS’ Regional Director (RD), and MDMR’ s
Commissioner. It is the responsibility of the policy board to set broad policy direction, reaffirm
priorities annually, and commit the necessary resources for management implementation (NMFS
et al., 2011). The management board is comprised of the NMFS Assistant Regional
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Administrator (ARA) for protected resources, the USFWS’ ARA for fisheries, DMR’ s Bureau
of Sea Run Fisheries and Habitat Chief, and a tribal representative. It is the responsibility of the
management board to set the recovery priorities, develop decision making frameworks for the
ASRF, provide direction, and commit resources in a transparent manner (NMFS et al., 2011).
The ASRF was the result of years of research and negotiation that resulted in the
designation of seven critical research and monitoring areas represented by interagency action
teams: (1) the marine and estuarine action team, (2) the connectivity action team, (3) the genetic
diversity action team, (4) the conservation hatchery action team, (5) the freshwater action team,
(6) the education and outreach action team, and (7) the stock assessment team (NMFS et al.
2011). Each action team is comprised of 3-5 individuals from the managing organizations.
Unlike the other levels of the governance framework there are no position specifications for the
action team members, instead membership on an action team is meant to reflect personal
expertise. It is the responsibility of the action teams to develop and seek approval for
management actions, develop the 5-year implementation plan, implement and monitor
management actions, coordinate across teams for efficiency, resolve policy and scientific
disagreements, and receive/review proposals (NMFS et al., 2011).
Research Objectives and Significance
Since the GOM DPS’ listing 17 years ago, several collective action agreements between
agencies, citizens, states, and countries have been formed to facilitate a coordinated decisionmaking structure. However, the social-science/policy interface of Atlantic salmon recovery
decision making in Maine had not yet been evaluated. By social-science/policy interface we
mean the relationships, communication tools, networks, and cooperation between the people and
agencies behind the recovery of the Atlantic salmon. Based on the understanding that
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conservation planning may be hindered if management entities do not communicate, hold shared
values, and agree upon management objectives (Game et al., 2013), an evaluation of how people
and agencies work with one another with respect to jurisdiction, capacity, and mission, may lead
to an increased understanding of how social and institutional factors shape entity interactions,
and establish an empirical understanding of barriers to collaboration, opportunities for
institutional transformation, and capacity for change.
Nearly a decade after its inception the ASRF is being internally reviewed and discussions
of yet another restructuring are in progress. This thesis seeks to understand the emergent
communication structures that shape the way decisions are made about the management of
Atlantic salmon in Maine and to take away lessons in joint-jurisdictional and collaborative
management in the realm of natural resources particularly under the umbrella of the ESA. As
collaborative governance structures are becoming more and more popular, it is becoming
increasingly necessary that we look beyond formal governance structures to explain decision
making and group dynamics. Collaborative governance can have many benefits like increased
fiscal and social capital but there are also struggles in application that are sometimes glossed
over in the literature. Using the ASRF and the GOM DPS of Atlantic salmon as a case study we
used communication network and collaborative governance theories to highlight some of these
issues and strengths in order to provide valuable information to the managing entities as well as
contribute to academic literature.
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CHAPTER 2:
UNDERSTANDING COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE FROM A
COMMUNICATION NETWORK PERSPECTIVE: A CASE
STUDY OF THE ATLANTIC SALMON
RECOVERY FRAMEWORK
Introduction
The conservation of imperiled species often requires effective coordination and
communication across local, state, national and international boundaries. The resulting
governance can take many forms and may evolve as changes in laws and authorities occur. The
term “collaborative governance” has become common in many disciplines, however the
definition and bounds of this concept can be difficult to characterize. Drawing from disciplines
ranging from public administration to anthropology, Emerson et al. (2012) offer a broad and
inter-disciplinary understanding of collaborative governance. This includes the processes and
structures associated with public policy, decision making, and management which bridge
boundaries between public agencies, levels of government, and/or public, private, and civic
organizations in order to accomplish a public policy goal or mission (Emerson et al., 2012).
While this definition provides a necessary framework for understanding collaborative
governance, there is a need to operationalize specific processes and structures in order to
evaluate governance contexts. When different government entities share jurisdiction over a
species, varying levels of expertise may require the co-production of scientific information and
policy pertaining to a single issue or goal (Goldstein and Butler, 2010). When managing entities
such as government agencies collaborate, they are able to leverage resources, form better
10

understandings of available data, and avoid duplicitous or counter-productive actions (Emerson
et al., 2012; Ulibarri and Scott, 2017). Despite these obvious theoretical benefits, application of
collaborative governance structures are challenging and often ineffective (Robins et al., 2011;
Westley et al., 2013). Challenges associated with jurisdictional confusion, institutional rigidity,
and communication (Bodin, 2017a) can all muddy the waters of already complicated ecological
issues. These challenges are compounded when changes to laws and authorities occur within
these rigid government institutions.
While species are typically managed at the state level in the United States, the ESA
designates management jurisdiction to one or more federal agencies when the species is found to
be at imminent risk of extinction. Under Section 6 of the ESA federal agencies are required to
cooperate to the “maximum practicable extent” with state government agencies. This may be
codified through a formal management or cooperative agreement (Endangered Species Act of
1973, As Amended through the 108th Congress, n.d.). In addition, the federal government
maintains a trust relationship with tribal nations. The doctrine of Trust Responsibility is a legally
enforceable fiduciary obligation of the United States to uphold tribal treaty rights, and protect
lands, assets and resources in the course of carrying out federal mandates. The Secretarial Order
for implementing the ESA clarifies responsibilities of the Department of Commerce and the
Department of the Interior in cases where administering the ESA may affect tribal lands, tribal
trust resources, or the exercise of tribal rights. This shift from primarily state to primarily federal
jurisdiction with cooperative relationships involving state and tribal partners can be difficult to
navigate, and the efficacy with which these joint-jurisdictional collaborations occur may vary
greatly (Bodin, 2017; Robins et al., 2011).
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With more than 1,600 species (163 of which are fishes) listed as threatened or
endangered in the United States alone (Center for Biological Diversity, n.d.), understanding how
different levels of government communicate, coordinate, and make decisions is essential to the
effective management and recovery of these species. Using the endangered Gulf of Maine
(GOM) Distinct Population Segment (DPS) of Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar) as a case study, we
sought to characterize the institutional barriers associated with shared jurisdiction of an
endangered species and address gaps in knowledge about the patterns of communication and
collaboration among federal, state, and tribal partners through Communication Network Analysis
(CNA) combined with qualitative interviews.
Case Study Context
Gulf of Maine Distinct Population Segment of Atlantic Salmon
Atlantic Salmon populations have suffered dramatic declines throughout their range over
the past several decades. Historically found in North American rivers and streams from Ungava
Bay in Canada to Long Island Sound in the United States, Atlantic Salmon once inhabited 34
rivers of the State of Maine (Saunders et al., 2006). Now the southern limit of distribution
(Saunders et al., 2006), Maine sees fewer than 2,000 Atlantic Salmon returning annually, less
than 1% of the historic population (NOAA, 2017). Long migrations and habitat sensitivity leave
Atlantic Salmon vulnerable to population declines and habitat disruptions and from dams,
pollution, and over-exploitation (USASAC, 2017).
History of Management
In 1980, the Maine Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) was established as a decisionmaking structure where managers, NGO’s, citizens, and industry met as a single group to discuss
Atlantic Salmon management. This group facilitated open discussion with managers and other
12

stakeholders while retaining agency and tribal decision-making powers for the signatories
(Commissioner of MDMR, Commissioner of the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and
Wildlife (MDIFW), and an at large Gubernatorial appointee).
By 1990 marine survival of Atlantic Salmon decreased nearly 80% (USASAC, 2017),
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service (USFWS) were considering the GOM DPS of Atlantic Salmon for
protection under the ESA. Despite efforts by the State of Maine to develop cooperative
agreements with industry, state and federal bureaucracies, and non-government environmental
organizations (NMFS et al., 2011), the GOM DPS was listed as endangered under the ESA in
2000 and expanded in 2009 with joint-listing authority delegated to NOAA and USFWS. This
shift in roles, responsibilities, and jurisdiction resulted in confusion and inefficiencies within the
governance system. In 2004 an independent review of the GOM DPS of Atlantic Salmon
management recommended that organizations implement a systematic and structured decisionmaking approach to recovery planning which focused on ecological risk and critical uncertainties
(NMFS et al., 2011). These recommendations, in conjunction with internal review processes,
eventually led to the dissolution of the TAC in 2005 (NMFS et al., 2011).
Since listing, USFWS and NOAA have had a cooperative agreement designating
individual authorities. The agreement delegates hatchery operations and freshwater concerns to
the USFWS, and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) passage and marine research
to NOAA (NMFS et al., 2011). MDMR has jurisdiction over all stocking permits in the State of
Maine and is therefore closely tied to the decisions and operations of the USFWS hatchery
supplementation programs. A cooperative agreement between NOAA and MDMR exists,
through which MDMR receives Atlantic Salmon related funding. While the Penobscot Nation
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(PN) has a legal right to a seat at the decision-making table, they have very few personnel or
resources to leverage when it comes to management decisions. Despite numerous cooperative
agreements, these four entities (NOAA, USFWS, MDMR, and PN) have divergent interests and
charges, making effective implementation of the collaborative governance system essential to
recovery efforts.
Current Governance
The Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework (ASRF) aimed to navigate the “differences in
legal authorities, agency procedures, agency protocols, and expertise [that had] led to confusion,
delays in decision making, and disagreements” (NMFS et al., 2011, p. 7) among organizations in
the past. From 2005-2011, building from the structured decision-making training undertaken by
representatives of NOAA and USFWS, the federal agencies, in conjunction with MDMR and
PN, drafted the ASRF (Gregory et al., 2012). This new collaborative governance structure was
intended to be “built on a foundation of agreement on the biological needs of the species,
identification of objectives or a shared goal, and actions to achieve that goal” (NMFS et al.,
2011, p. 7).
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Figure 2.1. Formal structure of the Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework with prescribed
organizational participation as described in the Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework unifying
policy document (NMFS et al., 2011).

The formal structure of the ASRF was the result of years of research and negotiation
which resulted in the formation of three hierarchal levels: A Policy Board, Management Board,
and Action Teams (Figure 2.1; NMFS et al., 2011). The Policy Board is responsible for setting
broad policy direction, reaffirming priorities annually, and committing the necessary resources
for management implementation (NMFS et al., 2011). It is the responsibility of the Management
Board to set the recovery priorities, develop decision making frameworks for the ASRF, provide
direction, and commit resources in a transparent manner (NMFS et al., 2011). The Action teams
represent seven critical research and monitoring areas represented by interagency teams: (1) the
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Marine and Estuarine Action Team (MEAT), (2) the Connectivity Action Team (CAT), (3) the
Genetic Diversity Action Team (GDAT), (4) the Conservation Hatchery Action Team (CHAT),
(5) the Freshwater Action Team (FWAT), (6) the Outreach and Education Action Team (OEAT),
and (7) the Stock Assessment Team (SAT) (NMFS et al. 2011). Each action team is comprised
of 3-5 individuals from the managing entities with some Action Teams including Ad Hoc
members from other organizations (e.g., academia). It is the responsibility of the action teams to:
1) develop and seek approval for management actions, 2) develop the 5-year implementation
plan, implement and monitor management actions, 3) coordinate across teams for efficiency, 4)
resolve policy and scientific disagreements, and 5) receive/review proposals (Table 1).
Environmental Governance Networks
Governance networks consist of formal and emergent social structures. Formal structures
refer to the stated or officially dictated roles and procedures for network engagement while
emergent structures arise organically around formal network structures (Ranson et al., 1980).
Formal governance structures explain only a portion of group dynamics. Network theory instead,
points to the importance of emergent social structures in forming a complete understanding of
policy decision making (Bevir, 2011; Kenis and Schneider, 1991).
Environmental systems rarely fall neatly within anthropogenic boundaries and political
demarcations. For this reason, analyses of environmental management may be approached from
a collaborative governance perspective (Bodin et al., 2017). These governance systems, made up
of multiple organizations, can be viewed as networks composed of actors (individuals and
organizations) and the ties (relationships) between them (Hartley, 2010; Robins et al., 2011).
Analyzing the social structure of a governance network can reveal communication
patterns, leadership roles, and power dynamics which influence the efficacy of the network to
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achieve intended outcomes (Robins et al., 2011). While there is no single structure that
guarantees “good” or “effective” governance, social structures can facilitate or hinder effective
policy decision making. Ineffective governance networks can be the consequence of structural
inadequacies (Robins et al., 2011). This research aims to analyze the emergent social structures
within the ASRF.
Research Objectives
We sought to characterize the relationships, communication tools, networks, and
cooperation among the people and agencies engaged in the recovery of the Atlantic Salmon.
Because conservation planning may be hindered if management entities communicate
ineffectively, hold divergent values, and disagree upon management objectives (Game et al.,
2013), an evaluation of how people and agencies work with one another with respect to
jurisdiction, capacity, and mission, may lead to an increased understanding of how social and
institutional factors shape entity interactions, barriers to collaboration, opportunities for
institutional transformation, and capacity for change.
This research is an integral part of ongoing collaborative efforts to restructure the ASRF.
Such a case study also provides an opportunity to understand the challenges associated with
joint-jurisdictional management in the realm of natural resources, particularly under the umbrella
of the ESA.
Methods
In order to better understand the emergent social structures within the ASRF, we used a
mixed-methods approach (Coviello, 2005) and a single case study methodology (Yin, 2003).
CNA is a method for studying the structural make-up of communication within a network
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(Rogers and Kincaid, 1981). Building upon the information collected from the CNA
questionnaire, we developed a semi-structured interview protocol (Seidman, 2013).
Data Generation
Communication Network Analysis and Sampling
For the purpose of this study membership in the ASRF was defined by the ASRF website
(https://northatlanticlcc.org/atlantic-salmon-recovery-project/groups/salmon-framework) roster,
which was then vetted by individuals within each organization. The resulting list of current
members (N=43) became the relevant actors in the network. Using the Dillman method (Dillman
et al., 2014), members were emailed a sociometric survey (via personalized Qualtrics link which
prevented sharing of links and multiple submissions). To account for possible membership
omissions, participants were encouraged to write in and answer the same sociometric questions
about additional members who were not listed. Because complete information is essential to
network analysis (Borgatti et al., 2009; Rogers and Kincaid, 1981) the Management Board
member(s) for each organization were contacted and their participation and support were secured
prior to administering the survey.
A total of 21 (49%) individuals responded within the first two weeks of receiving the
survey. After two weeks, a reminder letter was sent to the remaining members, resulting in an
additional five (11%) individuals completing the survey over the following two weeks. A second
reminder email was sent at the 4-week mark, announcing the closing date of the survey. During
this final collection period, 15 (35%) individuals submitted responses for a total of 95%
participation (n = 41).
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Survey Items
The sociometric survey included questions about the frequency and nature of member’s
communication with each of the other members of the ASRF (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981). All
questions were answered on either a 5-point Likert-like scale (frequency and framework
efficacy) or as close-ended categorical data (position in ASRF and time spent working in
Atlantic Salmon management and/or recovery).
Semi-Structured Interviews
All individuals who participated in the online survey were invited to participate in a
follow-up interview. Of the 41 survey participants, 28 individuals participated in an interview.
Participant selection aimed to capture maximum variation (Miles et al., 2014) of members based
on gender, age, time spent working in Atlantic Salmon management and/or recovery,
organizational affiliation, and position within the ASRF. Participants were continually added
until theoretical saturation occurred (when additional data collection no longer yielded new
insights, themes, or issues associated with the topic of interest; Bowen, 2009). During interviews
participants were asked questions about their personal experiences and perceptions of ASRF
operations and procedures in an attempt to gain insight into the lived experience of interviewees
(Seidman, 2013). All interviews were audio recorded.
Analytic Methods
Communication Network Analysis
R software (R Core Team, 2018) was used to construct and analyze a directed and
weighted network graph of individual communicative relationships among members of the
ASRF and aggregated communications of framework positions and organizational affiliations.
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The r packages igraph (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006), network (Butts, 2008), ndtv (Bender-deMoll,
2018), and sna (Butts, 2016) were used in analysis and visual representation of data.
Communicative weights were based upon self-reported frequencies of communication related to
Atlantic Salmon. The frequencies were reported as “never”, “annually”, “monthly”, “weekly”, or
“daily” and converted to numeric values 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Directed network density,
community membership via spin glass community detection (Reichardt and Bornholdt, 2006),
and eigenvector centrality were completed using R software (R Core Team, 2018).
Interview Analysis
All audio recordings were transcribed by a professional transcription service
(verbalink.io) and checked for accuracy by the interviewer. Transcripts were analyzed using
QSR International’s NVivo Pro 11 software. Data were analyzed using two coding cycles. The
first cycle assigned descriptive and process codes to the data, while staying close to the original
words of the participants (Miles et al., 2014). During the second cycle, many first cycle codes
were combined, and pattern codes were assigned to concepts and ideas emerging from and
building upon the first cycle descriptive codes (Miles et al., 2014). During the entire coding
process, detailed memos were recorded (Miles et al., 2014) in NVivo Pro 11. Copies of each
stage of the data analysis process were preserved to ensure that the iterative coding process
followed a logical and traceable path from start to finish.
Results
Network Composition
The ASRF is comprised of 43 individuals from seven organizations in the following
proportions; 42% NOAA (n=18), 28% USFWS (n=12), 18% MDMR (n=8), 5% PN (n=2), 7%
other government agencies including the Maine Department of Environmental Protection
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(MDEP), the United States Geological Survey (USGS), and the University of Maine (n=3;
Figure 2.1). The directed network density of individual communicative relationships in the
ASRF was 56% (Figure 2.2), indicating that just over half of the possible relationships in the
network have been realized.
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P = Policy Board

M = Management Board

A = Action Team

C = Action Team Chair

X = Not a member

Figure 2.2. Network graph of individual communication within the Atlantic Salmon Recovery
Framework by organizational affiliation. The size and relative position of each node is a
function of the number and strength of communicative relationships of the individual in
Fruchterman-reingold layout.

The 43 members of the ASRF were segregated into three distinct communities with a
total modularity of .093 indicating relatively high communication among communities. A
community is formed when individuals within a network have stronger communicative
relationships than the mean of the entire network (Bodin et al., 2017). Modularity measures the
strength of division between communities within a network from -1 to 1. Positive modularity
values indicate more and/or stronger relationships among individuals within a community than
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with those outside the community (Bruggeman et al., 2012). One individual did not fall into any
of the three communities, this individual had the lowest number and weakest quality of
communicative relationships of any ASRF member. This individual self-identified as ‘not a
member of the ASRF’. The first community (n=19) was made up of all individuals employed by
NOAA (n= 18), with one USFWS employee belonging to the same community. All other
USFWS employees belonged to a second community (n=11). The third community (n=12) was
made up of all employees of MDMR (n = 8), PN (n=2), and the ASRF members employed by
organizations other than NOAA, USFWS, MDMR, and PN (n=3; Figure 2.2). Individual
communicative relationships were organized based on organizational affiliation as opposed to
ASRF position, there was not a significant relationship between ASRF position and quantity or
quality of individual communicative relationships with other similarly positioned individuals
(Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3. Network graph of individual communication by Atlantic Salmon Recovery
Framework position. The size and relative position of each node is a function of the number and
strength of communicative relationships of the individual in Fruchterman-reingold layout.

NOAA employs 91% of the most socially influential individuals within the network
(Figure 2.4). This was evidenced by the disproportionally high number of ASRF members
employed by NOAA who ranked within the 75th percentile (n=10) of eigenvector centrality
scores in the network. All other organizations exhibited disproportionally low numbers of
employees ranking within the 75th percentile of eigenvector centrality scores (Figure 2.4). The
higher the eigenvector centrality score, the greater social influence an individual holds within
their network (Ruhnau, 2000). An individual employed by USFWS with an eigenvector
centrality score higher than the network median (Figure 2.2; Figure 2.4) reported not even being
a member of the ASRF, despite being described as occupying a significant management role
within the USFWS.
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Figure 2.4. Eigenvector centrality scores and organizational affiliation of each member of the
Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework by percentile.

Discrepancies Between Formal and Emergent Structures
Several individuals self-reported ASRF roles and/or membership status that differed from
their peers’ perspectives. One individual identified by the formal ASRF structure as the Policy
Board representative for NOAA reported not even being a member of the ASRF (indicated as an
X in Figure 2.2). Two individuals from both MDMR and from NOAA identified themselves as
members of the Management Board (Table 2.1; Figure 2.2) despite the formal framework
structure identifying only 1 position from each management organization (Table 1). One
individual from NOAA reported being the “ASRF Coordinator”, a position that has emerged
within the ASRF but is not documented in the formal structure. The majority of those who were
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aware of this emergent position indicated assumptions about the role but admitted they did not
know the actual scope of duties associated with the position.
In general, individuals had little knowledge of Action Team membership. Individuals
reported being members of Action Teams which their peers did not corroborate or where
identified as members of Action Teams with which they themselves did not identify. The
perceived rationale behind Action Team Chair appointments varied from team to team and
among individuals, as did their organizational positions and relative power to make decisions for
their organizations.
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Table 1.1. Formal and emergent structure of the Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework. Formal
structure refers to the framework outlined by the Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework (NMFS
et al., 2011) and emergent structure refers to self-identified position based on survey results.
ASRF
Position

Roles

Formal structure

Emergent
structure

Policy Board
Set programmatic direction
Commit resources

Management
Board

Set recovery priorities
Develop decision-making
frameworks
Provide direction to Action
Teams
Commit resources

Action Teams
CAT
CHAT

FWAT

Develop management
actions and 5-year
implementation plan

Unspecified
Affiliation
(1) Chair

Implement and monitor
management actions

(3-5) Members

GDAT

Coordinate across action
teams for efficiency

MEAT

Resolve policy and
scientific disagreements
Review proposals

SAT
NOAA

USFWS

MDMR

PN

OTHER

Discussion
The ASRF is a centralized action network, meaning that inter-organizational interactions
and collaborations are described by a unifying policy document (Gray, 1985). The presence of a
centralized description of collaborative interactions implies a set of common goals that are to be
achieved through network operation (e.g., species conservation and recovery; Gray, 1985). This
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constitution sets up a formal network structure, around which emergent network ties develop
(Ansell et al., 2017). The emergent structures of the ASRF show that there is a high degree of
communication among individuals within the ASRF (Figure 2.2). However, a governance
structure is not inherently effective because it is overtly networked (Robins et al., 2011).
While networks with high density may foster of a sense of belonging, shared group
identity, and the potential for group cohesion and conformity (Bodin et al., 2017), the ASRF
exhibits other communicative patterns which may hinder successful collaboration. The structural
components identified through CNA and the themes which emerged during the semi-structured
interviews described three prominent and problematic themes; 1) slow and ineffective decision
making, 2) confusion surrounding leadership, and 3) lack of adaptability. These results indicate
that the ASRF is likely not operating as an effective collaborative governance structure, but
rather as individual organizations with overlapping interests and regular (but informal)
communication.
Slow and Ineffective Decision Making
During semi-structured interviews, ASRF members stated that ‘tough decisions are not
made’ and ‘we are not recovering the species, we are maintaining the status quo.’ These
observations can be, at least in part explained by the dispersal of social capital. Centrality refers
to the quantity and quality of social interactions within a network and is a common measure of
an actor’s social influence (Ruhnau, 2000; Schoch and Brandes, 2016). Eigenvector centrality is
a specific type of centrality used in weighted and bi-directional networks to account the quantity
and quality of direct relationships as well as indirect relationships (Ruhnau, 2000). Individuals
with higher eigenvector centrality have more social capital, and thus a greater capacity to exert
social influence within their network. Decision making within the ASRF is likely slowed by the
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dispersal of social influence among many members. With a median eigenvector centrality of
0.524 (Figure 2.4), a large proportion of ASRF members exhibit a high degree of social
influence.
NOAA has the largest presence in the ASRF and occupies a disproportionately influential
role as a result of employing 91% of the individuals with highest-ranking eigenvector centrality
within the network (Figure 2.4). Due to the multi-organizational make-up of the ASRF, the
disproportionate centrality exhibited by NOAA may indicate inequalities in voice and power
within the network. This may slow decision making and reduce willingness of other agency
members to collaborate (Bodin, 2017a).
Confusion Surrounding Leadership and Accountability
Organizational studies have highlighted leadership as a critical component of a successful
organization, however, less often do we consider the role of leadership within collaborative
governance structures (Robins et al., 2011). Environmental governance structures often require
multiple forms of leadership to operate effectively (Bodin et al., 2017). Members of the ASRF
reported frustration and confusion around leadership roles in the ASRF and within their
individual organizations. The emergence of an “ASRF Coordinator” within the framework is
evidence of this need and desire for leadership. However, the unofficial nature of this position,
and the affiliation with the most socially influential organization in the network (NOAA) risks
ineffective application of an essential network position.
There are influential individuals situated in the network who do not serve as members of
the ASRF in an official capacity (Figure 2.2). These individuals are influencing decision making
from outside the formal governance structure. When influential individuals do not have a
formalized role in management structures the lack of defined roles can create confusion with
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regard to leadership and order of command (Westley et al., 2013). Additionally, the inequal
organizational representation on the Management and Policy Boards results in other individuals
feeling under-represented and under-valued. Building upon these structural inequalities,
members reported concerns of total lack of management within the ASRF, stating that the Policy
and Management Boards do not “meet,” “communicate with one another,” or “provide direction
or information” to Action Teams.
Lack of Adaptability
In the ASRF, the abundance of individuals exhibiting high centrality signals a dispersal
of decision-making loci among individuals with similar centrality. When this occurs, groups
exhibit high levels of institutional rigidity and low capacity for structural change (Newman and
Dale, 2005). This can be observed by the three clearly distinguishable communities within the
network. The three communities, which fall generally along organizational boundaries, indicate
that communicative relationships within organizations are stronger than those among
organizations (Figure 2.2). Strong organizational identity is not uncommon, and community
division within networks contributes to diverse interactions and increases the likelihood of
heterogenous information and perspectives (Bodin, 2017a). Networks like the ASRF, which have
distinct communities exhibiting low positive modularity, can experience the benefits of
information and identity heterogeneity, while possibly avoiding an “us-vs-them” mind-set
common between communities with high positive modularity (Bodin, 2017a). This is because
each community exhibits strong information sharing relationships with the other communities in
the network. As a result, the ASRF has a high degree of resilience to individual staff changes or
relationship changes among organizations. However, this also means that the ASRF has a low
degree of adaptability and may be maintaining ineffective relationships that cannot build upon
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jurisdictional changes to move forward (i.e. stagnation). The same entities have been in
collaboration for many years under many governance structures but are not necessarily growing
together.
Future Research and Considerations
The delicate balance of communication, information sharing, diversity of perspectives,
and cohesive goals underlying management decisions is important to understanding the social
dynamics of joint-jurisdictional resource management. Bridges are typically considered to be
critical components of a network, the ASRF has such high network density (Figure 2.2) that
individuals do not rely on bridging relationships. However, networks do not exist in a vacuum. A
combination of intra- and inter-network relationships tell a more complete story of resource
management. While this research focused exclusively on intra-network relationships in the
ASRF, inter-network interactions provide access to diverse resources which in many ways shape
the internal dynamics of a network (Newman and Dale, 2005). Further research to understand the
bridges that connect the ASRF to NGOs, industry, political entities, universities, and other
interested stakeholders could increase understanding of ASRF dynamics, facilitate additional
collaborative partnerships, and highlight opportunities for education and outreach.
Conclusion
Joint-jurisdictional and collaborative management dilemmas are more prevalent now than
ever before. As the major challenges facing our natural world (e.g. habitat loss, fragmentation,
exploitation, and climate change) put more species at risk, complex issues will continue to call
for holistic management which can span anthropogenic boundaries. Understanding the socialstructural components of joint-jurisdictional governance structures can shed light on the social
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processes which drive collaborative behaviors and contribute to the efficacy of environmental
governance (Bevir, 2011; Kenis and Schneider, 1991).
The organizations involved in the ASRF have a long history of working together and
exhibit a high degree of communication among individuals and organizations. These strong
communicative pathways are readily available to build upon moving forward. While
collaborative governance is a theoretically appealing option for joint-jurisdictional management,
it is not the only option available. As this research is unfolding, the managing agencies involved
in the ASRF are working to restructure.
As of the writing of this paper, the managing organizations have announced a 1-year pilot
program, this re-structured governance system attempts to address the shortcomings experienced
by ASRF members by re-organizing Action Teams into geographic subsections that align with
the Final Recovery Plan for the GOM DPS of Atlantic Salmon (NOAA and USFWS, 2019).
These teams, referred to as Salmon Habitat Recovery Unit (SHRU) Teams, include a broader
membership including all interested stakeholders regardless of affiliation. In accordance with the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), a coordinating committee comprised of members of
the managing organizations will still reserve formal decision-making powers. The new structure
calls for more Management Board engagement and provides these individuals with a technical
support team aimed at helping navigate complex issues which in the past have been ignored or
tabled in the absence of complete information. This more inclusive board (referred to as the
Implementation Team) is intended to increase vertical communication. At the end of 2020 the
new structure will once again be evaluated, this emphasis on adaptation is intended to set a
precedent for growth and management adjustment extending beyond the pilot year.

32

As the ASRF is restructured and evaluated over the coming years, an emphasis on
defining leadership roles and information hubs may ameliorate decision-making issues described
by members. The following considerations may serve to increase collaborative efficiency:
•

Encourage more inter-agency collaboration through communication, problem
setting/solving, and shared group identity within Boards and Teams.

•

Design a formal framework that aligns with the power structures and decision-making
authorities of individuals within each organization.

•

Organize information hubs to increase information dispersal efficiency and reduce
operational confusion.

•

Formalize the implementation of the re-structured framework through trainings
and/or meetings to assure individuals understand operational procedures, personal
roles and responsibilities, available resources, and big pictures goals/objectives.

Regardless of the framework chosen, an emphasis on clear and transparent operations,
responsibilities, and expectations for working together will be essential to collaborative success.
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CHAPTER 3:
DOES LEADERSHIP HAVE A ROLE IN COLLABORATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE?
Introduction
Environmental management is, by nature, a collaborative endeavor, one that often
requires multiple managers, agencies (e.g., state, federal, and tribal departments), and
organizations (e.g., non-government organizations) to collaboratively design, produce and share
credible and legitimate science which may be utilized in decision making (Bodin, 2017; Cash, et
al., 2006). Individual resource managers, agencies, and organizations find that they require more
resources and/or jurisdictional authority than they have access to. Thus managers are working
together to leverage resources through collaborations with other entities in order to meet their
management and policy goals (Cash et al., 2006). Through collaboration these entities strive to
better understand ecological systems, produce relevant information, expand expertise, and avoid
redundant and counter-productive actions (Emerson et al., 2012; Ulibarri and Scott, 2017). The
resulting partnerships are often referred to as “collaborative governance structures.”
Collaborative governance refers to the systems associated with public policy decision making
and resource management which span the jurisdictional boundaries of public agencies, levels of
government, and/or public and private spheres to pursue a policy goal (Emerson et al., 2012).
Much attention is paid to the conditions and structures under which collaborative action
occurs (Ansell et al., 2017; Bodin, 2017a; Gray, 1985; Robins et al., 2011; Sullivan et al., 2013).
In general, groups with a history of positive working relationships and mutual respect are more
likely to achieve successful collaborative partnerships (Chris Ansell and Gash, 2008; Gray,
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1985). These conditions may manifest as common perceptions of a shared issue, recognition of
the benefits of working together, equally balanced resources and power, and clearly articulated
and adaptable frameworks (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Gray, 1985).
The term “governance” itself has evolved. Originally referring to the act of governing,
the term has come to describe a new mode of operation. This mode is distinct from hierarchical
control models, and more cooperative among diverse actors (Marin and Mayntz, 1991). Because
governance has changed, and become more collaborative, leadership has also evolved. As
governing bodies transition from top-down hierarchies to collaborative frameworks, it would be
misguided to assume that mainstream literature on hierarchal leadership in the public or private
sector would be generalizable (Silvia, 2011). Research emphasis has focused on the conditions
and structure of productive collaborative governance, while relatively little emphasis has been
placed on the role leadership may play in these complex systems (Robins et al., 2011).
Collaborative governance structures are networks of organizations which, although in
partnership, exist independently of one another. As such, each organization possesses its own
goals, procedures, risk perceptions, and resources. This makes these relationships and
interactions more challenging to form (Huxham and Vangen, 2000; Silvia 2011).
Interorganizational collaborations may form when organizations find their actions and strategies
dependent upon decisions taken by other organizations (Gray, 1985). When organizations or
agencies encounter indivisible problems (problems which exceed that capacity of a single
organization), collaborative relationships are often viewed as the only viable response (Emery
and Trist, 1965; Gray, 1985).
In the United States, the management of Threatened and Endangered species under the
ESA often becomes indivisible, requiring state, federal, and tribal partnerships. The federal
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Public Trust Doctrine of the United States specifies that fish and wildlife shall be held in public
trust and managed by the government for the benefit of all current and future citizens of the
United States (Quirke, 2016). Fish and wildlife are considered mobile resources which are not
subject to geographic boundaries and thus are not assigned as property assets (Quirke, 2016). In
the United States, species are managed at the state level. However, the ESA delegates
management jurisdiction to one or more federal agencies when a species is determined to be at
imminent risk of extinction. Section 6 of the ESA requires that these managing federal agencies
cooperate with appropriate state agencies to the maximum practicable extent (Endangered
Species Act of 1973, As Amended through the 108th Congress, n.d.). The conditions of these
federal and state collaborations are codified through cooperative agreements or formal
management plans.
In addition to these state and federal partnerships, the federal government maintains a
trust relationship with recognized tribal nations under the doctrine of Trust Responsibility
(USFWS, 2018). Under the doctrine of Trust Responsibility, the United States government is
required to uphold tribal treaty rights and protect tribal lands, assets, and resources which may be
impacted during the course of carrying-out a federal mandate (USFWS, 2018). This means that
species listed as Threatened or Endangered under the United States ESA are intended to be
jointly managed by federal, state, and tribal entities (Nazzaro, 2005). An example of a
management strategy that is meant to be collaborative is the Atlantic Salmon Recovery
Framework (ASRF). The ASRF consists of federal, state, and tribal partners who collaborate to
manage and conserve the critically endangered Gulf of Maine (GOM) Distinct Population
Segment (DPS) of Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar). Created in 2011, this governance structure
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coordinates the research and restoration actions of the managing agencies charged with Atlantic
salmon conservation in the State of Maine.
Using the ASRF as a case study we sought to understand the role that leadership plays in
multi-agency governance structures in the context of adaptive capacity and collaborative
efficacy. We used semi-structured interviews to characterize perceptions and experiences
associated with participation in the ASRF.
Case Study: Atlantic Salmon in Maine
Over the past century, Atlantic salmon populations have declined dramatically
throughout their range (Saunders et al., 2006). The species historically occupied North American
rivers and streams from Ungava Bay in Canada to Long Island Sound in the United States.
Atlantic salmon are presently extirpated from most of their historic United States range. With
Maine being the southern limit of the Atlantic salmon’s range, current returns are estimated to be
just 1% of the historic population (Saunders et al., 2006). Atlantic salmon are an anadromous
species that migrate long distances from natal headwater streams to oceanic adult feeding
grounds (NOAA 2016). Long migrations and habitat sensitivity leave Atlantic salmon vulnerable
to disruptions from dams, pollution, over-exploitation, and climate change (USASAC, 2017).
The GOM DPS was listed as Endangered under the ESA in December of 2000. The DPS was
later expanded to include additional watersheds in 2009. Under the ESA joint listing authority
was delegated to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) under the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS). Atlantic salmon have been the subject of exploitation and management for the better
part of the last two centuries. Given the low population size of the GOM DPS and the reduced
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range of Atlantic salmon in the United states, effective and adaptive management is considered
essential to the conservation of the species (NMFS et al., 2011).
Despite having a detailed designation of formal roles and responsibilities (NMFS et al.,
2011), the ASRF is viewed as ineffective and burdensome by the majority of participants (Flye et
al., 2019). This is because the emergent structure of the ASRF is wrought with constrained
communication patterns and confusion surrounding roles, responsibilities, and leadership. As an
applied research endeavor, we have partnered with the ASRF to identify barriers and
opportunities to improve institutional collaboration and capacity for effective decision making.
Governance History and Overview
The ASRF is the latest of several governance structures developed over the past few
decades to manage Atlantic salmon in Maine. Some of these changes may be attributed to shifts
in jurisdictional authorities which have occurred as the population has changed over time. From
1980 to 2005 managers, citizens, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), industry, and other
interested stakeholders met as a single group to discuss Atlantic salmon conservation, recovery,
and management. Voting rights were reserved for agency signatories. This group, known as the
Maine Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), was transparent and inclusive, but lacked a clear
decision-making structure for navigating complex management issues.
When the GOM DPS was first listed under the ESA, management jurisdiction shifted
from primarily state to federal jurisdiction. Since listing, the DPS has been cooperatively
managed by a combination of federal, state, and tribal natural resource agencies. Through a
combination of agreements, tribal trust rights and responsibilities, and agreed upon collaborative
governance structures the federal agencies (NOAA and USFWS), state agency (Maine
Department of Marine resources; MDMR) and Penobscot Nation (PN), have defined and
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redefined roles and responsibilities associated with the conservation and restoration of wild
Atlantic salmon in Maine rivers.
Following an independent review of the Maine Atlantic salmon program in 2005, these
partners employed a structured decision-making approach to restructure and optimize the
governance system (Gregory et al., 2011; NMFS et al., 2011), which resulted in the ASRF. The
design of the ASRF was intended to address challenges and confusion associated with
jurisdiction, expertise, and agency procedures that had delayed decision making (NMFS et al.,
2011). With the implementation of the ASRF came a narrowing of stakeholder participation. The
ASRF is comprised exclusively of federal, state, and tribal resource managers along with ad hoc
participation by academic affiliates. Given the “strained, and at times, litigious relationship” in
TAC between the state, hydropower industry, and federal agencies, the framework proposed
“Interagency Boards” and “Action Teams” (NMFS et al. 2011 p.7) in an attempt to blur the
organizational lines and increase communication.
The resulting ASRF is a hierarchal structure consisting of three basic levels; a Policy
Board, Management Board, and seven Action Teams. The Policy Board is comprised of the
NMFS’ Regional Administrator (RA), the USFWS’ Regional Director (RD), and MDMR’s
Commissioner and a tribal representative position which is filled by a member of the PN
Department of Natural Resources. It is the responsibility of the Policy Board to set broad policy
direction, reaffirm priorities annually, and commit the necessary resources for management
implementation (NMFS et al. 2011; Flye et al., 2019). The Management Board is comprised of
the NMFS Assistant Regional Administrator (ARA) for protected resources, the USFWS’ ARA
for fisheries, DMR’s Bureau of Sea Run Fisheries and Habitat Chief, and a tribal representative
position which is filled by the PN’s Department of Natural Resources’ Fisheries Biologist. It is
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the responsibility of the Management Board to i) set recovery priorities, ii) develop decisionmaking frameworks, iii) provide direction, and iv) commit resources in a transparent manner
(NMFS et al. 2011; Flye et al., 2019). The third level of the ASRF is comprised of seven
interagency Action Teams. The Action Teams represent seven critical research and monitoring
areas; i) the Marine and Estuarine Action Team (MEAT; n=10), ii) the Connectivity Action
Team (CAT; n=5), iii) the Genetic Diversity Action Team (GDAT; n=3), iv) the Conservation
Hatchery Action Team (CHAT; n=8), v) the Freshwater Action Team (FWAT; n=3), vi) the
Outreach and Education Action Team (OEAT; n=4), and vii) the Stock Assessment Team (SAT;
n=3) (NMFS et al. 2011; Flye et al., 2019). It is the responsibility of the Action Teams to i)
develop and seek approval for management actions, ii) develop the 5-year implementation plan,
iii) implement and monitor management actions, iv) coordinate across teams for efficiency, v)
resolve policy and scientific disagreements, and vi) receive/review proposals (NMFS et al.,
2011).
Research Objectives
The impetus for this research came from the ASRF leadership. Members and leaders felt
that the ASRF was not an effective governance structure (Flye et al., 2019). The data collected
from a previous sociometric questionnaire (Chapter 2) provided quantitative background
information on opinions of framework efficacy and operations, communication patterns, and
perceptions of ASRF strengths and weaknesses (Flye et al., 2019). In just over a decade of
operation, the structure is considered ‘ineffective’ and salmon management is viewed as being in
‘need of a new governance structure’ (NMFS et al., 2019; Flye et al., 2019). The communication
between the current management entities are strong and persistent, often going back decades.
However, the data suggest that these relationships may not be effective or adaptive in the face of
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ecological and institutional challenges (Flye et al., 2019; Chapter 2). Building from this
information, the semi-structured interviews dove deeper into how the ASRF operates and why
members have developed their individual perceptions of the governance structure. The objectives
of this case study were to explore ASRF member’s views, experiences, and preferences about,
the operations and procedures of the ASRF, communication within the ASRF, understand the
structure and hierarchy of the ASRF and to inform current efforts to restructure the ASRF with
the goal of increasing efficacy.
Methods
Data Collection
We sought to include all members of the ASRF in our sample. For the purposes of this
case study, membership in the ASRF was defined by the “members” section of the ASRF
website (https://atlanticsalmonrestoration.org/groups/salmon-framework). This preliminary list
of members was then vetted by key individuals within the managing agencies. Clearly defined
boundaries and complete representation are essential to case study research (Yin, 2003).
Therefore, we secured Management Board support prior to data collection. All members of the
ASRF who participated in the online sociometric survey (n=41) were invited to participate in
one-on-one semi-structured interviews. Using case study methodology allowed us to characterize
the how and why of conditions, situations, and events within the ASRF without removing the
natural context of the structure (Creswell, 1998; Yin, 2003).
The criteria used for interview participant selection aimed to capture the maximum
variation (Miles et al., 2014) among members based on gender, age, time spent working in
Atlantic salmon management, organizational affiliation, and position within the ASRF.
Participants were continually added until theoretical saturation occurred (Miles et al., 2014;
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Seidman, 2013). Twenty-eight members (65%) participated in semi-structured interviews (30-90
minutes) between September 1st, 2019 and October 3rd, 2019. Most interviews (n=22) were
conducted in person at locations chosen by the participant. In-person interviews took place at the
University of Maine, Orono, Maine (n=6), a coffee shop in Old Town, Maine (n=1), and federal,
state, and tribal offices located in Orono (n=9), Augusta (n=3), East Orland (n=1), and Indian
Island (n=2) Maine. A minority of the interviews (n=6) were conducted via phone at the
participants request. Ultimately, 13 individuals from NOAA, 5 individuals from USFWS, 6
individuals from MDMR, 2 individuals from PN, and 2 faculty members from University of
Maine (one a USGS employee) participated in semi-structured interviews. All interviews were
conducted by the first author of this paper.
We used interviewing as a method for understanding the lived experience of participants,
this allowed us to understand the meaning that others make of their experiences (Seidman, 2013).
Participants were asked a combination of open and close-ended questions regarding their
perceptions of ASRF decision making and general questions about their experience with Atlantic
salmon governance. Participants were asked to describe the challenges and barriers they have
experienced within the ASRF, the strengths and weaknesses of the ASRF, ways they would like
to change the governance structure, their opinions on collaborative governance, their perceptions
of how willing the agencies are to collaborate with one another, how the ASRF is supposed to
operate, and how the ASRF actually operates (Appendix B). In order to accommodate participant
responses, the interview protocol was flexible and evolved through the process of data generation
(sensu Seidman, 2013; Coviello, 2005). The evolution of the interview protocol was documented
through researcher memos and reflective journaling (Miles et al., 2014; Ortlipp, 2008). Prior to
interviews, the details of the informed consent (IRB number 2018-04-03) were discussed
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verbally to ensure that the participants fully understood the study’s purpose, procedures,
risks/benefits, means of confidentiality, and the voluntary nature of their participation (Seidman,
2013). Upon receiving participant consent, all interviews were audio recorded.
Data Analysis
Audio Recording and Transcription
Audio recordings of all semi-structured interviews were transcribed by a professional
transcription service (Verbalink.io). Because decisions made during the transcription process
(e.g., punctuation, pauses, where to end sentences, etc.) can impact the meaning and analysis of
interview data (Seidman, 2014), notes regarding body language and tone were written during the
interviews. The audio recordings and these notes were used to proof and edit the professionally
prepared transcripts and multiple reviews were done for each interview.
Coding
All data analysis was completed using QSR International’s NVivo Pro 11 software. Each
participant was treated as a single case, and classification attributes were assigned to each
(gender, age, level of education, salmon program tenure, organizational affiliation, job title, and
ASRF position). These classification attributes allowed comparisons and aggregations of
responses based upon attributes of interest. The data were analyzed using two primary coding
cycles. The first cycle of coding stayed very close to the original words of the participants and
assigned descriptive and process codes to chunks of data (Miles et al., 2014). During this first
cycle, each code was given a description to allow for reflection on the use of each code and to
ensure consistent use across participants. This first cycle of coding was used to summarize
sections of the data (Miles et al., 2014). After several iterations of first cycle coding, many first
cycle codes were combined due to a high level of similarity between codes. The second cycle or
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pattern coding built upon the first cycle of descriptive coding by merging connected codes to
create themes (Miles et al., 2014). During the entire coding process, detailed memos were
recorded (Miles et al., 2014; Ortlipp, 2008) in QSR International’s NVivo Pro 11. Copies of each
stage of the data analysis process were preserved to ensure that the iterative coding process
followed a logical and traceable path from start to finish.
Results and Discussion
ASRF Composition
The ASRF is made up of members employed by NOAA (n=18), USFWS (n=12), MDMR
(n=8), and PN (n=2), with ad hoc members from the Maine Department of Environmental
Protection (MDEP; n=1), the University of Maine (n=2), and the United States Geologic Survey
(n=1). NOAA makes up 0% (n=0) of the policy board, 33% (n = 2) of the management board,
and 47% (n=17) of the Action Teams. USFWS makes up 33% (n=1) of the policy board, 16%
(n=1) of the management board, and 20% (n=7) of the Action Teams. MDMR makes up 33%
(n= 1) of the policy board, 33% (n= 2) of the management board, and 20% (n=7) of the Action
Teams. PN makes up 33% (n=1) of the policy board, 16% (n=1) of the management board, and
3% (n=1) of the Action Teams. Individuals employed by other organizations make up 0% (n=0)
of the Policy and Management Boards, and 11% (n= 4) of the Action Teams (Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1. Organizational participation in the Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework by
board/level based on self-identified position in fall 2018. Pie charts represent proportion of each
level occupied by the organization of the corresponding color.
Collaborative Leadership
In a collaborative organization leadership does not refer to the actions of or power held
by a single individual, but rather leadership is created and facilitated through a network of
complex interactions (Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001; McGreavy et al., 2016). Organizations and
governance structures exhibit different types of leadership characteristics which may be filled
based on hierarchical models, emergent processes, or in some cases, even left vacant (Bodin,
2017b; Robins et al., 2011). This suggests that when organizations collaborate, attention is often
placed on the coordination and integration of individual organizations, at the expense of
leadership, which may be considered irrelevant for collaborative arrangements. However,
leadership plays an important role in organizational culture and identity, individual and
organizational buy-in, and perceived member agency (Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001; Robins et al.,
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2011). In the ASRF, governance-level leadership is viewed as being absent. When this occurs,
individuals often default to agency or organizational power structures. However, effective
collaboration cannot occur between agencies which are operating with entirely independent
leadership structures.
In a collaborative governance structure, the role of leadership is more nuanced, leaders of
collaborative structures like the ASRF do not have the ability to formally evaluate the
performance of all members, or the authority to punish or reward behaviors (Agranoff and Silvia,
2012; Van Slyke and Alexander, 2006). Silvia and McGuire (2010) found several empirical
differences between leadership in hierarchal and collaborative contexts. Traditional hierarchal
leaders spent the majority of their time scheduling and coordinating activities, while leaders in
collaborative structures spent the majority of their time building interpersonal relationships, trust,
and cohesive group identities. While there are clear differences in the roles and the actions
undertaken by leaders in hierarchal and collaborative contexts, literature aimed at identifying and
understanding these differences for real world applications remains scarce (Silvia, 2011).
Agranoff and McGuire (2001) developed four categories of behaviors which they found
to be necessary for effective leaders in collaborative environments; activation, framing,
mobilization, and synthesizing. In this model, activation refers to the identification and inclusion
of relevant individuals and resources (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). Framing occurs when the
formal structure of the collaborative group is developed, this step includes the identification of
management and administrative roles as well as the construction of group identity and culture
(Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). The third category, mobilization, requires leaders to motivate
and inspire all group members regardless of organizational affiliation. This step is aimed at
garnering commitment and buy-in from all partners (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). The final
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step, synthesizing, works to build interpersonal relationships and foster trust among participants
while encouraging the open exchange of information (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). While each
of these modes of leadership behavior were found to play a role in collaborative networks, we
propose that these behaviors ultimately represent three underlying leadership conditions which
are necessary for collaborative success; shared goals/approach to recovery, transparency, and
trust. Effective leadership is both a condition of and component of these three essential themes.
These essential leadership behaviors have not been incorporated into the ASRF, and the resulting
structure is viewed as ineffective.
When multiple government agencies share responsibility and jurisdiction over
environmental systems as is often the case with large scale environmental issues and
management under the United States ESA, organizational- and governance-level leadership
dynamics can have positive or negative impacts on the resulting collaborative governance
structure (McGuire and Silvia, 2009). Thus, it is essential to have shared goals among
participants, which are reflected in transparently described roles, responsibilities, and
expectations, which all participants trust will be upheld.
Shared Goals/Approach to Recovery
Approach to recovery refers to the ideas, values, and procedures associated with Atlantic
salmon recovery in Maine. When managing entities do not hold shared values and agree upon
management objectives conservation planning is hindered (Game, et al., 2013). In this case the
practicality and desirability of different management actions is not the same among levels within
the ASRF or among the agencies which make up the governance structure (Table 3.1). These
differences stem from differing risk tolerances, scientific knowledge, biological views, and an
overall absence of governance level direction (Table 3.1).
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By design, the ASRF governance structure divides individuals into Action Teams based
on individual expertise (NMFS et al., 2011). In doing so members report feeling isolated from
individuals in other Action Teams and suggest that the “silos” they are placed in keep them from
communicating and working with one another (Table 3.1). Some members go even further to
suggest that these “silos” create single-minded focus on individual recovery priorities which lead
to agencies, individuals, and Action Teams pushing their own agendas with little consideration
or opportunity for big picture management and recovery (Table 3.1).
Individual organizations (NOAA, USFWS, MDMR, and PN) also have their own
approaches to recovery. Representatives from each organization reported a commitment to
recovering the GOM DPS to the recovery standards outlined in the 2009 final recovery plan
(NMFS et al., 2009). However, individuals within the organizations report different views on the
plausibility of recovery and the actions that would result in down-listing (Table 3.1). These
differences may be explained, in part, by different levels of risk tolerance and bureaucratic
pressures experienced by each organization.
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Table 3.1. Quotes from ASRF member interview transcripts which exemplify the sub-theme of
shared goals/approach to recovery organized by unifying concepts.
Concept

Example quotes

Agency differences

"I think there are some organizational differences that are somewhat driven into
separate missions, you know, and how we handle things".
"One of the things I guess I have concerns about is that not everyone takes the
same approach with management activities".
…"agencies do that (review and set priorities) independently…"
"it's kind of this self-fulfilling prophecy…pulling most of the fish that have come
out of the Penobscot to harvest their eggs. Not even letting them go up into the
habitat that we spent millions and millions of dollars to try to recover. It seems
very counterproductive”.
"We can throw fish at the problem all we want but until we cure what’s going on
right here, we’re done. You can’t grow corn in a parking lot, and you can’t grow
salmon in an impounded river".

No governance direction

"And I think part of the role of [the management] board is to kind of help kind of
direct some of the research – or some of the projects that the staff ends up
actually doing, but I don't think it functions particularly well and I don't think
we've been doing a lot of direction".
“The management board has no set decision making process. It’s not by majority.
It’s not by consensus. We don’t know how we make decisions".
"Or the fact that I started ten years ago, and no one ever gave me a description of
what the framework even was and that was the year the thing was drafted”.
"Decisions made by the Framework that are ignored? I don't know because I
can't like pin down a decision made by the Framework".

Membership

"I mean I guess I could see those groups potentially given a venue to express
their positions to the framework. You know, I…don't know if we included
everyone as like a member, if that would kind of dilute an already sort of
confused number of groups”.
"I don’t think NGOs should have seats on action teams. I don’t think they should
have a seat on the management board. I don’t think they should have a seat on
the policy board”.

Risk tolerance

"Salmon management seems to be a practice of insanity of you keep trying to do
the same thing and expecting a different answer. But I've never been – dealt with
invasive species where you… Extinction is a real possibility. So, it's very – I
understand that is very cavalier for me to say, "Oh, well just try something
different." Well, there is a risk associated with that”.
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Individuals from every agency expressed an interest in moving away from the “status
quo” of management and recovery actions, however, their views of the “status quo” and their
desired deviation from it differed. Some individuals favor a more “natural approach” which
moves away from hatchery supplementation and takes more risks in terms of genetic line
preservation. Others feel that the Atlantic salmon population cannot be sustained or recovered
without extensive hatchery supplementation in its current form (Table 3.1). All of the agencies in
the ASRF share the same stated goal (i.e., Atlantic salmon recovery), but, the underlying motives
and acceptable approaches to reaching this goal vary greatly. These differences are highlighted in
the following quotes which exemplify conflicting views of how much human intervention is
acceptable in salmon recovery; “we’re not recovering, we are maintaining the status quo,”
“genetic line variation is the top priority,” and “letting the fish act naturally is most important,
not hatchery supplementation.” These differences in motivations and recovery priorities may
have led to issues in transparency and trust, which can result from the absence of shared goals.
There are leadership behaviors which have been shown to foster the creation of shared
goals and approaches in collaborative frameworks. One of these behaviors is referred to as
framing. Framing is an essential and nuanced process during which the rules of conduct, values,
and norms of the structure are developed (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001;Silvia, 2001; Kickert and
Koppenjan, 1997; Gray, 1985). Framing occurs at two critical stages of collaborative governance
planning, the process stage (i.e., the formal implementation of the framework) and the participant
stage (i.e., integration of participants into specific roles of the framework). Framing, at the
process stage of collaborative structures, benefits from a deep understanding of the needs of all
parties involved in the collaboration (Silvia, 2011; Vangen and Huxham, 2003). Process framing
can be addressed by formal implementation and integration of expectations and procedures at the
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initial inception of a collaborative governance structure (Vangen and Huxham, 2003). This
critical phase may have been poorly executed during the formation of the ASRF. Members of the
ASRF expressed universal confusion surrounding operational procedure; “I never know when a
proposal needs to go through the ASRF” and “I think I read the document once, but it has been
years” and the ASRF “really has no impact on my daily job.” These quotes exemplify the issues
with procedural understanding of the ASRF and hint at issues of participant framing. Participants
in the ASRF do not understand where they fit into the big picture goals of the framework “I don’t
know what the framework is doing, maybe other people are meeting.” The data suggest that the
views of different members of the ASRF have never been fully reconciled. As a result, members
of the ASRF feel unable to make use of the collaborative framework. Many Action Team
members feel that there is no unifying approach to recovery in the ASRF. They content that the
different approaches taken by individual agencies are not discussed, which isolates them from
one another along organizational boundaries.
One of the largest challenges in collaborative governance is the identification and
inclusion of the appropriate stakeholders (Kretser, Beckmann, and Berger, 2018). Governance
structures with too many people can become paralyzed by indecision, opposing views, and
personalities. Those with too narrow a stakeholder group can suffer from bias and incomplete
understandings of the issues at hand (Silvia, 2011). Ultimately, someone must make the decision
about who and how to include appropriate parties. Agranoff and McGuire (2009) refer to this
process as “activation” and suggest that this is one of the key responsibilities of collaborative
leaders. The ASRF is comprised of members of the agencies responsible for Atlantic salmon
management in Maine (NOAA, USFWS, MDMR, and PN). Within the ASRF, opinions differ on
whether these groups are the only appropriate groups to include. Some individuals expressed

51

confusion and concern about participant selection. Ad hoc members from academia and other
state agencies (i.e., Maine Department of Environmental Protection) have been allowed to
participate, while ad hoc membership from NGOs has been denied. One member who feels the
ASRF ought to be comprised solely of agency members states; “we need to get our own house in
order before we bring in anyone else.” Others feel that the ASRF is missing out on important
views and expertise from other stakeholder groups; “the NGOs play a huge role, like, they should
have some sort of say.” Others feel that the ASRF is not even inclusive of all agency members
working on Atlantic salmon; “it [is] just so secretive” or “I work on Atlantic salmon but have
never been asked to participate.” These quotes support the contention that membership remains
an unresolved issue for the ASRF.
Transparency
The ASRF, like many collaborative structures, suffers from challenges associated with
accountability, resource allocation, and knowledge sharing (Armitage et al., 2009). Careful
consideration of institutional processes, structures, and incentives is vital as stakeholder
intensions are rarely if ever socially or politically neutral (Armitage et al., 2009). Transparency
with regards to motivation, resources, and priorities is an important first step in attending to this
challenge. Collaborative governance structures afford participants with certain benefits including
increased access to resources, expanded social capacity, and access to additional information
(Bodin, 2017). However, actors may sometimes agree to participate in collaborative structures as
a means of achieving their own interests, while failing to contribute to jointly negotiated goals
and outcomes (Bodin, 2017b). When organizations enter into these superficial partnerships,
tangible outcomes are often absent or merely symbolic, while substantive results are left
unrealized (Bodin, 2017b).
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Issues in transparency were communicated by members of the ASRF concerning partner
motivations, available resources, priorities, and constraints. The Policy Board has the
responsibility to set broad programmatic direction and commit necessary resources for
management and recovery efforts (NMFS et al., 2011). However, members of the ASRF report
that the Policy Board “does not meet,” “does not communicate with one another,” and is overall
“absent” in the ASRF (Table 2). Without broad programmatic direction and resource
commitment from the Policy Board, the Management Board would be next in line to define
governance level direction, priorities, and resources. Members suggest that the Management
Board is “not effective,” “does not make decisions,” and does not have regular or predictable
communication with Action Teams (Table 3.2). This lack of unified direction and committal of
resources from the Policy and Management Boards forces individual agencies to identify and
pursue their own priorities.
When partners are not transparent (or when members perceive a lack of transparency)
commitment to the process may be greatly diminished (Chris Ansell and Gash, 2008). Participant
buy-in or commitment to collaborative processes is an essential component of collaborative
governance success (Margerum, 2002). Both member commitment and upper-level management
commitment have been viewed as being critical to collaborative governance success (Yaffee and
Wondolleck, 2003). In the ASRF both levels experience problems associated with commitment
and buy-in.
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Table 3.2. Quotes from ASRF member interview transcripts which exemplify the sub-theme of
transparency organized by unifying concepts.
Concept

Example quotes

Procedural confusion

"[the ASRF] kinda seemed to be so secretive. Like, I was asked to be a member, but
then I wasn’t asked to do anything as a member".
…"it didn't seem particularly transparent".
"I wasn’t involved in the construction of the framework, and it seemed like it was this
mystical beast that was happening in the background”.
…”it’s unclear to me what the role of the action teams are..."
"people don’t know how it’s supposed to work, and the other thing is people don’t
use it”.
"I think one of the most difficult parts of it that people have trouble grasping are what
decisions need to fall under the framework’s decision making process versus their
own agency decision making process. I think that needs to be clarified”.

Unilateral decision making

I mean, that was fish passage decisions have such an impact on salmon that I
personally feel it should be more inclusive and more transparent, but that's not how
they're currently being managed”.
"Ad hoc decisions are made by individual people that are not in accordance with the
plan that was laid out, and so those actions are being implemented differently than
what they had agreed on as a group…there's as lot of disagreement on some of those
actions that have been taken and where there's just that autonomous, immediate
decision that was made differently".

Resources
"Really commit resources in a transparent manner, that definitely is not happening".
"I mean I guess I could see those groups potentially given a venue to express their
positions to the framework. You know, I…don't know if we included everyone as like
a member, if that would kind of dilute an already sort of confused number of groups”.
I think there is intentional side stepping but I also think there is no clear path on a lot
of these things”.
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Trust
Trust-based relationships are essential components of collaborative systems. Many
collaborative efforts ultimately fail to reach their goals and objectives due to the absence of a
strong relational foundation (Getha-Taylor et al., 2019; Wei-Skillern et al., 2015). While there is
a high degree of communication among members of the ASRF (Flye et al., 2019), relational
embeddedness does not necessarily lead to successful collaboration (Robins et al., 2011). Several
members of the ASRF expressed concerns about the motivations and commitment of some of the
partner agencies, particularly those in upper management contexts. “I know this sounds like a
conspiracy, but [one of the partners] is actively trying to get out the salmon business…they keep
making excuses about [reducing resource allocation].” These members feel that one of the
federal partners is receiving high-level guidance to sabotage collaborative efforts and to extricate
resources (including employee time and expertise) from Atlantic salmon management (Table
3.3).
During the development of the ASRF, in-depth resource allocation models were used to
maximize recovery efforts based on available agency resources. The stated purpose was that
agencies would combine resources for joint projects that the ASRF prioritized. This pool of
resources never came to fruition, and many members felt that some of the agencies had not been
transparent about their willingness to contribute to the ASRF. Members stated that, “resources
are not being shared”, “we never discuss our priorities, and how they might change over time.”
When collaborative partners do not agree upon (or clearly communicate) responsibilities and
expectations, trust can quickly be eroded (Chris Ansell and Gash, 2008).
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Table 3.3. Quotes from ASRF member interview transcripts which exemplify the sub-theme of
trust organized by unifying concepts.
Concept
Resources

Example quotes

…"[collaboration], you know [it's], based on to what degree the groups trust each
other and are willing to put their assets at risk".
"I think that individual agencies are making unilateral decisions on what their
resources are gonna be and where they can contribute. So for instance, if our
monetary resources are declining in the Fish and Wildlife Service and I'm
making decisions for my program across the region about where we're gonna be
making investments, I may have less funding to be able to put to Maine but then
I think that we need to be having better collaborations across all of those
agencies in the framework for how those investments are most important toward
Atlantic salmon recovery".
"No one wants to give up their assets yet there's this reality that decisions can't be
made in isolation or at least, you know, recovery actions can't be made in
isolation, and so there's this tension between this – you know, for the agencies
for self-preservation and the maintenance of personnel and funds and efforts
within each agency and the tension with the realization that in order to really do
substantive good there needs to be – you need to work together".

Trust in leadership
"I don’t think the management board has ever done anything in the five years
that I’ve been around that made any positive difference for Atlantic salmon. And
basically, what they’ve done for five years is do nothing. Make no decisions.
And there have been four or five good ones that we could have made”.
"I will say I have a strong concern. It’s not the people at Craig Brook. I have a
strong concern that at the higher level, Fish and Wildlife Service is aggressively
exploring – and I may sound like a conspiracy theorist – aggressively exploring
ways to get out of Atlantic salmon”.
…"today, not only biologically but politically, salmon management stands on the
edge of a knife. Right on that edge, right on that edge, we are a whisper, a breath
away from the federal agencies unplugging the system”.
"I think one of the most difficult parts of it that people have trouble grasping are
what decisions need to fall under the framework’s decision-making process
versus their own agency decision making process. I think that needs to be
clarified”.
Accountability
"If we really didn't like a stocking decision, for instance, I don't know that NMFS
has any recourse to stop that. You know, even if we really didn't like it, it's their
decision. So I think there's that. I mean you have a lot of independent smart
people making decisions they don't necessarily want to defer to some
overarching Framework that is really hard to define. I think that's going to be a
barrier".
"I think in that case the Marine and Estuarine Action Team was expected to
provide comments, but there was no particular pressure on me to provide
comments, so I did not”.
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Importantly, when decisions are made within the ASRF, they are not always upheld by
the individuals and agencies charged with executing them. Agencies not being held accountable
for collaborative goals was commonly reported as an issue during semi-structured interviews
(Table 3.3); “[biologists] might just decide to stock where they want to even though we decided
on something else.” When individuals and agencies pursue their own agendas at the expense of
the collaborative structure it undermines the collaborative process (Chris Ansell and Gash,
2008). Once trust has been eroded, it can be difficult to rebuild.
Conclusion
In a resource limited world, environmental agencies and mangers are forming
collaborative governance structures in an attempt to leverage resources, access more information,
and avoid working at cross-purposes (Emerson et al., 2012). The conditions under which
collaborative arrangements occur and thrive need to be the focus of on-going scholarship if we
are to expect such complex systems to produce their intended outcomes (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern,
2003). Based on our findings within the ASRF, leadership has a major influence on the success
and long-term sustainability of collaborative governance structures. Participant responses
highlighted a common theme which connected members of all levels and agency affiliations;
concerns about leadership within the ASRF. These concerns fell into three sub-themes which the
members of the ASRF felt were missing in the current governance structure; i) a shared
goal/approach to recovery, ii) transparency, and iii) trust.
We found that collaborative leadership behaviors which foster shared goals, and increase
transparency and trust are perceived as desirable by collaborative governance participants. We
propose that a combination of leadership behaviors which foster shared goals, transparency, and
trust may lead to increased adaptive capacity and ultimately increase the likelihood of successful

57

collaborative partnerships. A recognition that these leadership behaviors differ from those that
characterize traditional hierarchal leadership, is important to future research on, and creation of,
collaborative governance structures. While there are lessons which may be learned from business
and organizational studies, continued research which focuses on the unique leadership needs of
collaborative environmental governance structures is essential.
The ASRF is currently undergoing a restructuring effort informed by this research and
ASRF workshops and focus groups that have aimed to characterize shortcomings of the current
governance structure. The newly proposed structure (the Collaborative Management Strategy for
the Gulf of Maine Atlantic Salmon Recovery Program) is being implemented as a 1-year pilot
program (NMFS et al., 2019). This new structure no longer divides members into Action Teams
based on narrow fields of expertise, but rather designates three field-level groups which align
with the geographic distribution of salmon and mirror the distinct regions outlined in the final
recovery plan (USFWS, 2009). These teams, referred to Salmon Habitat Recovery Unit (SHRU)
Teams are open to all interested stakeholders, while reserving decision-making authorities for the
managing agencies in compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). Each
SHRU team consists of all interested stakeholders along with a coordinating committee
comprised of agency personnel who are responsible for setting up meetings, compiling
information, recording suggestions/concerns, making management decisions, and coordinating
with the Management Board (NMFS et al., 2019). The Management Board meetings have also
been expanded to increase inclusivity and streamline information sharing. Individuals from each
SHRU team coordinating committee, a science advisor, and a framework administrator will
attend all management board meetings. Many of the issues associated with leadership, shared
goals, transparency, and trust are being addressed in the new structure through the use of the four
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essential leadership behaviors outlined by Agranoff and McGuire (2001); activation, framing,
mobilization, and synthesis.
Agranoff and McGuire (2001) refer the process of defining membership boundaries as
activation. Collaborative structures that do not bring the “right” parties to the table are often
unable to meet their intended goals due to issues with resources, jurisdiction, social capacity, and
access to essential information and perspectives (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001).In the creation of
the new pilot structure, leaders have attempted to address concerns about membership inclusivity
by creating new tiers of participation which can accommodate a wider range of interested
stakeholders. Those leading the charge for restructuring gained a more in-depth understanding of
member motivations and needs by including all ASRF members in the workshops and focus
groups which informed the new structure. In completing these workshops, the ASRF leaders
undertook what Agranoff and McGuire (2001) refer to as framing. Framing is the process
through which the norms and practices of a structure are established. Undertaking this step as a
whole, may increase the likelihood that the new structure will align with the more ridged
institutional structures already in place for each agency.
Bringing all of the managing agencies together and facilitating communication among
individuals at different hierarchal levels in their agencies allowed managers and staff to
acknowledge the challenges each are facing. This process, referred to as mobilization (Agranoff
and McGuire, 2001), fosters a sense of community and trust which encourage collaborative
partners to compromise and jointly create a shared goal (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). The new
governance structure has built in opportunities for vertical communication between the
management board and field staff which is intended to foster stronger relationships throughout
the structure and increase accountability at all levels (NMFS et al., 2019). Synthesis is an
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ongoing process through which leaders must facilitate compromise and foster an environment of
conditions favorable to collaboration (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). This process is essential to
sustained member commitment and is greatly impacted by the adaptive capacity of the
governance structure (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Margerum, 2002; Chris Ansell and Gash,
2008). While it is too soon to evaluate the quality of synthesis behaviors undertaken by leaders in
the Collaborative Management Strategy for the GOM DPS Recovery Program, the introduction
of the new structure as a 1-year pilot program which will be re-evaluated and adjusted by all of
the partnering agencies shows an initial commitment to sustained collaboration and adaptive
management. Adaptability is an important part of collaborative governance. official mechanisms
for adaptation will help integrate new positions or roles and minimize feelings of distrust and
contribute to feelings of control and ownership (Armitage et al., 2009).
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
Research Significance
The pressures facing our natural world will continue to require large scale holistic and
integrated solutions which can span anthropogenic boundaries (Bodin, 2017; Emerson and
Nabatchi, 2015; Robins et al., 2011). As habitat loss and fragmentation, species exploitation, and
environmental changes continue to pose major threats to our functioning natural world, resource
agencies, managers, and stakeholders will likely find that their individual resources are not
sufficient to meet their conservation goals. In the face of these indivisible problems,
organizations and individuals will continue to turn toward collaborative governance as a means
of working toward large scale objectives and as a solution to resource and competency
limitations (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015; Ulibarri and Scott, 2017). However, in order to be
effective, we need to continue to develop our understanding of collaborative governance in the
realm of natural resource management.
The current discourse in academic literature is beginning to tackle these topics, however,
to date the majority of collaborative governance research focuses primarily on the conditions of
collective action, while largely ignoring government-level and structural approaches including
the ways in which leadership roles and practices shape collaborative governance structures
(Ansell et al., 2017; Bodin, 2017a; Gray, 1985; Robins et al., 2011; Sullivan et al., 2013) . This
thesis begins to tackle some of these gaps in the literature. Collaborative governance structures
are often considered without context, that is, researchers approach collaboration as a result of
specific conditions (Agranoff and Silvia, 2012; Christopher Ansell et al., 2017) often with little
consideration for the unifying contextual elements of the system. However, our research suggests
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that contextual embeddedness plays a crucial role in understanding collaborative governance
regimens. The majority of literature to date, focuses on grassroots or community driven
collaborative structures with an emphasis on the conditions which facilitate collaborative action
(Ansell et al., 2017; Bodin, 2017a; Gray, 1985; Robins et al., 2011; Sullivan et al., 2013). There
is, however, a growing need to expand the academic discourse to evaluate government-level
collaborations and to consider these collaborations within the context of their intended public
policy goal or outcome. Collaborative governance in the public sector, is often a response to
resource limitations, overlapping jurisdictional authorities, and large-scale issues (Emerson and
Nabatchi, 2015; Ulibarri and Scott, 2017).
This thesis serves as an example of how mixed-methods structural approaches to
collaborative governance research can highlight areas of strength and weakness and provide real
world benefits to natural resource agencies and stakeholders. The collaborative governance
research presented in this thesis has relevance in a wide range of disciplines ranging from
academia to public policy and applied resource management. First, this work contributes to the
growing literature on collaborative governance in the realm of natural resource conservation.
Second, and more broadly this research contributes to the understanding of network research in
the policy arena and more specifically to the use of mixed-methods approaches for network
research.
Research Outcomes
The research presented in this thesis can serve as an effective approach to understanding
and critiquing governance structures. The restructuring of the ASRF is an example of the realworld benefits that a mixed-methods structural approach to collaborative governance can
provide. The results of this thesis were presented to the entire ASRF at a 3-day workshop in
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2018. The findings served as the foundation for discussions about organizational integration,
leadership, power allocation, and decision-making structures among ASRF members. The
discussions about these findings lead to decisions around how these different social dynamics
should be incorporated into the future structure of the governance framework. The results of our
research in conjunction with these facilitated discussions have resulted in a restructuring of the
ASRF. The new collaborative governance system under which Atlantic salmon will be managed
in Maine will be implemented as a 1-year pilot program beginning in 2020. This new structure,
referred to the Collaborative Management Strategy for the Gulf of Maine Atlantic Salmon
Recovery Program, attempts to address many of the concerns posed in both chapters 2 and 3 of
this thesis.
The objectives of this research were to develop a better understanding of (1)
communication and collaboration, (2) institutional capacity for change and (3) barriers to
collaboration, in joint-jurisdictional and collaborative governance structures focused on natural
resource and/or endangered species management. The following paragraphs will discuss the
ways in which the research team was able to meet these objectives and the ways which the ASRF
has utilized this research to improve the collaborative governance structure for the management
of Atlantic salmon in the State of Maine.
Communication and Collaboration Outcomes
1. The CNA (Chapter 2) we conducted revealed high network density within the ASRF,
however, members indicated that these communications are not resulting in effective
decision making around Atlantic salmon management and recovery. Through the use
of semi-structured interviews (Chapter 3) we were able to uncover the underlying
communicative issues which were hindering effective communication patterns. We
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found members did not trust one another and were therefore largely unwilling to
abide by joint decisions or contribute resources to collaborative efforts.
2. Understanding the communication patterns of individuals within the ASRF allowed
us to understand the flow of information (Figure 2.2; 2.3) and allowed us to form a
better understanding of how entities are communicating and sharing information with
one another. Information sharing is an essential component of environmental
planning and successful collaborative relationships (Bodin, 2017; Game et al., 2013).
Barriers to Collaboration Outcomes
1. By implementing a structural approach to communication, we were able to address
deficiencies in information flow (Figure 2.2; 2.3) and inequalities in social
influence/power (Figure 2.4) which inhibited collaboration among members. These
barriers to collaboration were demonstrated empirically by the community division
(Figure 2.1) which occurred along organizational boundaries. The low positive
modularity (0.093), however, demonstrated the presence of interorganizational bonds
and an opportunity for strategic community building moving forward.
2. The concerns expressed by members of the ASRF ultimately related back to issues
with leadership within individual organizations as well as the collaborative
governance structure. Under the broad theme of leadership, we found that ASRF
members lacked a shared goal/approach to recovery, transparency about motivations,
resources, and values, and trust in one another at an agency level (Tables 3.1;
3.2;3.3). In collaborative governance structures, leadership plays an important role in
creating governance level culture and identity, fostering individual and organizational
buy-in, and has broad impacts on the way members perceive individual agency
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(Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001; Robins et al., 2011) In the absence of these fundamental
components of collaborative leadership (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Agranoff and
Silvia, 2012; Silvia, 2001) the ASRF was unable to function as a truly collaborative
structure.
Institutional Capacity for Change Outcomes
1. The community division (Figure 2.2), inequal power structures (Figure 2.4), and
varying levels of participation revealed by the CNA allowed us to highlight areas in
which individual organizations could transform to address these inequalities as well
as transformative governance approaches which could mediate organizational
differences. One such transformative approach which the new structure employs
entails a deep understanding of the organizational structures of each individual
agency (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). The research conducted in this thesis
illuminated the differences in organizational structures which the current framework
was not attending to. We recommended a focus on alignment between individual
organizations and the governance structure which will streamline the process of
engaging in the collaborative governance structure (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001).
2. By using semi-structured interviews to understand the experiences and perspectives
of ASRF members we were able to highlight not only the barriers to collaboration
present in the current governance framework, but we were able to identify
institutional strategies and capacities for growth/change. Chapter 3 identifies
leadership behaviors which can be implemented in the new governance structure in
order to mediate some of the issues experienced in the ASRF, specifically focusing on
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the processes of framing, activation, mobilizing, and synthesizing (Agranoff and
McGuire, 2001).
The CNA we conducted (Chapter 2), provided a detailed map of all Atlantic salmon
related communication occurring within the ASRF on an individual basis (Figure 2.1). CNA is a
form of social network analysis which provides a picture of human interaction within a defined
network, by using interpersonal relationships as the unit of analysis (Karathanos, 1994). In
completing this CNA we were able to, at least partially, address each of our research objectives.
The semi-structured interviews we conducted (Chapter 3) built upon the foundational
information garnered from the CNA to provide an understanding of the lived experience of
ASRF members (Seidman, 2013). This approach allowed us to get at the how and why
underlying the communication patterns, power inequalities, community division, and
organizational differences discussed in chapter 2 (Seidman, 2013). This process gave us the
unique opportunity to connect structural features of the ASRF with the experiences and opinions
of those within the governance structure. By combining these two types of data we were able to
develop an understanding of the communication structures within the ASRF, the barriers which
were impeding effective collaboration, and finally the institutional capacity of the system to
change. This information allowed us to provide the following specific recommendations to the
ASRF.
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Final Thoughts
This thesis is a mixed-method case study of the ASRF which, i) provided applied results
to the agency members and leaders charged with Atlantic salmon management in Maine, ii)
informed the current restructuring of the Atlantic salmon management/recovery program in
Maine, iii) demonstrated how structural and qualitative approaches can be combined to evaluate
governance structures and/or organization, and iv) contributions to primary literature on
communication, collaboration, and opportunities for/barriers to institutional capacity for change
and growth in the realm of natural resource and/or endangered species management. Although
this research was conducted as a case study, the results and lessons learned have much wider
applications which can and should be applied to research on other natural resource oriented
collaborative governance structures in order to further test our theories and frameworks and build
a more robust understanding of collaborative governance structures organized around issues of
natural resource conservation.
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APPENDIX A
COMMUNICATION NETWORK ANALYSIS SURVEY
Section A. In this section we would like to know a little about you and your position in Atlantic
salmon recovery and/or management.

Q1. What organization are you employed by?
[Dropdown menu choices]
-------------------------------------------Maine Department of Environmental Protection
Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife
Maine Department of Marine Resources
National Oceanographic Atmospheric Administration
Penobscot Indian Nation
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Non-governmental Organization
Other

[Display if Q1 ‘Non-governmental Organization’ is selected]
Q2. What is the name of the Non-Governmental Organization you are employed by?
[Open text box]

[Display if Q1 ‘Other’ is selected]
Q3. What is the name of the organization you are employed by?
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[Open text box]

Q4. What is your job title?
[Open text box]

Q5. Which ASRF groups(s) are you currently working on? (Check all that apply)
☐

Policy Board

☐

Management Board

☐

Action Team(s)

☐

Ad Hoc Group (unofficial or recently incorporated group)

☐

I am not part of the ASRF
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[Display if Q5 ‘Action Team(s)’ is selected]
Q6. Which action team(s) are you a part of? (Check all that apply)
☐

Stock Assessment Action Team

☐

Marine and Estuary Action Team

☐

Connectivity Action Team

☐

Freshwater Action Team

☐

Conservation Hatchery Action Team

☐

Genetic Diversity Action Team

☐

Education Outreach Action Team

[Display if Q5 ‘Ad Hoc Group’ is selected]
Q7. Please explain the purpose of the Ad Hoc group you are a part of.
[Open text box]

[Display if Q5 ‘I am not part of the ASRF’ is selected]
Q8. Please describe your professional role(s) in Atlantic salmon management.
[Open text box]
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Q9. How important do you feel your contributions are to the Atlantic salmon Recovery
Framework?
O Extremely Unimportant
O Somewhat Unimportant
O Neither Unimportant nor Important
O Somewhat Important
O Extremely Important

Q10. How important do you feel your contributions are to Atlantic salmon recovery?
O Extremely Unimportant
O Somewhat Unimportant
O Neither Unimportant nor Important
O Somewhat Important
O Extremely Important
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Section B. In this section we would like to know a little about your communication styles
and preferences related to Atlantic salmon recovery and/or management.

Q11. Please rank in order the following types of communication based on your preference for
communicating with individuals WITHIN YOUR OWN ORGANIZATION. The first
indicating your highest preference for communication and the last being your least preferred
mode of communication related to Atlantic salmon. Use your mouse to drag options up and
down.

Email
Telephone
Impromptu In-Person
Scheduled In-Person
Other. Please Explain.
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Q12. Please rank in order the following types of communication based on your preference for
communication with individuals OUTSIDE YOUR OWN ORGANIZATION. The first
indication your highest preference for communication and the last being your least preferred
mode of communication related to Atlantic salmon. Use your mouse to drag options up and
down.

Email
Telephone
Impromptu In-Peron
Scheduled In-Person
Other. Please Explain.

Q13. Please specify the frequency with which you communicate with each of the individuals
listed below regarding Atlantic salmon. If your name is on the list below, please select “Never”
as the frequency with which you communicate with yourself.
Never

Annually

Monthly

Weekly

Daily

ASRF Member 1

O

O

O

O

O

ASRF Member 2

O

O

O

O

O

……………..

O

O

O

O

O

ASRF Member 45

O

O

O

O

O
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Q14. Please list the FIRST and LAST NAME and professional AFFILIATION of any
individuals you communicate with about Atlantic salmon who were not included on the previous
list and specify the frequency with which you communicate with them.

[Open text

Never

Annually

Monthly

Weekly

Daily

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

box]
[Open text
box]
[Open text
box]
[Open text
box]

Q15. When you communicate with the individuals listed below about Atlantic salmon, who
typically initiates the communication?
I Do

They Do

Equal Initiation

Third Party

ASRF Member 1

O

O

O

O

ASRF Member 2

O

O

O

O

…………………

O

O

O

O

ASRF Member 45

O

O

O

O
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Q16. Using the dropdown lists, please indicate the frequency with which you have each of the
following types of communications with the individuals listed below.

ASRF Member 1

How often do you receive information
that you need to do your job from the
following people?
O Never O Sometimes O Frequently

How often do you discuss difficult work situations
or seek work related advice from the following
people?
O Never O Sometimes O Frequently

ASRF Member 2

O Never O Sometimes O Frequently

O Never O Sometimes O Frequently

…………………

O Never O Sometimes O Frequently

O Never O Sometimes O Frequently

ASRF Member 45

O Never O Sometimes O Frequently

O Never O Sometimes O Frequently

Q17. Please indicate how productive you feel your interactions are with individuals listed below.
Reminder, your responses are confidential.
Extremely
Unproductive

Somewhat
Unproductive

Somewhat
Productive

Extremely
Productive

O

Neither
Unproductive nor
Productive
O

ASRF Member 1

O

O

O

ASRF Member 2

O

O

O

O

O

…………………

O

O

O

O

O

ASRF Member 45

O

O

O

O

O
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Section C. In this section we would like to know about your perceptions of the decisionmaking process within the Atlantic Salmon Recovery Framework based on the following
hypothetical situations.

Q18. A dam owner has applied to relicense their dam through FERC. As a condition of
relicensing, the dam owner is required to demonstrate 95% downstream passage of smolts in 24
hours. In order to test this, the dam owner will need to conduct 3 years of studies requiring a
minimum of 50,000 smolts.

Which action team should take the lead on making decisions related to this project?

O Stock Assessment Action Team
O Marine and Estuary Action Team
O Connectivity Action Team
O Freshwater Action Team
O Conservation Hatchery Action Team
O Genetic Diversity Action Team
O Education Outreach Action Team
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Q19. Please indicate the boards or teams that would be responsible for each of the following
aspects of the project described above.

Information sharing refers to the dissemination of facts about the project, which may include biological
or legal background information.
Technical evaluation refers to the assessment of the project's design in terms of scientific rigor or
validity.
Program evaluation refers to the assessment of the project's feasibility in terms of resources.
Policy evaluation refers to the assessment of the project's acceptability based on rules, regulations, or
laws already in place.

Policy Board

Information
Sharing
☐

Technical
evaluation
☐

Program
Evaluation
☐

Policy
evaluation
☐

Management Board

☐

☐

☐

☐

Action Team 1

☐

☐

☐

☐

Action Team 2

☐

☐

☐

☐

……………

☐

☐

☐

☐

Action Team 6

☐

☐

☐

☐

83

Q20. A researcher has proposed stocking Atlantic salmon smolts from the Sheepscot River
genetic line into the Kennebec River.

Which action team should take the lead on making decisions related to this project?

O

Stock Assessment Action Team

O

Marine and Estuary Action Team

O

Connectivity Action Team

O

Freshwater Action Team

O

Conservation Hatchery Action Team

O

Genetic Diversity Action Team

O

Education Outreach Action Team
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Q21. Please indicate the boards or teams that would be responsible for each of the following
aspects of the project described above.

Information sharing refers to the dissemination of facts about the project, which may include biological
or legal background information.
Technical evaluation refers to the assessment of the project's design in terms of scientific rigor or
validity.
Program evaluation refers to the assessment of the project's feasibility in terms of resources.
Policy evaluation refers to the assessment of the project's acceptability based on rules, regulations, or
laws already in place.

Information
Sharing

Technical
evaluation

Program
Evaluation

Policy
evaluation

Policy Board

☐

☐

☐

☐

Management Board

☐

☐

☐

☐

Action Team 1

☐

☐

☐

☐

Action Team 2

☐

☐

☐

☐

……………

☐

☐

☐

☐

Action Team 6

☐

☐

☐

☐
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Q22. Decisions must be made about the proposals described in the last 2 questions. Supposing
that consensus cannot be reached within and/or between action teams.

In your experience, what are the next steps that would be taken under the current framework?
[Open text box]

Q23. In your opinion, how effective is the ASRF as a governance structure?
Extremely
Ineffective

Somewhat
Ineffective

O

O

Neither
Ineffective nor
Effective
O

Somewhat
Effective

Extremely
Effective

O

O

Section D. In this section we would like to know about your education and demographic data.
Q24. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed.
[Dropdown menu choices]
------------------------------High School
2 Year Degree
4 Year Degree
Master’s Degree
Doctorate
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Q25. Sex
[Dropdown menu choices]
-------------------------------Male
Female
Prefer not to answer

Q26. Age
[Dropdown menu choices]
----------------------------18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75-84
85 or older
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Q27. We will be conducting in person interviews to build upon the information you have
provided in this survey. Your responses are essential to furthering our understanding of the
current Atlantic salmon governance structure and management efforts in Maine.

Would you be willing to participate in a 60-minute interview at a time and location convenient to
you?
O Yes
O No
O I’m not sure
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APPENDIX B
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Individual role in Atlantic salmon management (within their organization)
1. How long have you worked in Atlantic salmon recovery? Through what organizations? (i.e.,
NOAA, MDIFW, DMR, PIN, NGOs, etc.)
2. What are your responsibilities related to Atlantic salmon recovery/management?
a. What % of your work week is spent on work related to Atlantic salmon?

Action teams and boards
3. I understand that you are currently a member of [insert board(s) or action team(s)]. What do you
see as the role of [insert action team, management board, or policy board] in the ASRF?
4. How did you come to serve in this/these role(s)within the ASRF?
5. How often does the [insert action team, management board, or policy board] meet and who calls
or organizes these meetings?
6. I’m going to ask you to rate how worthwhile these meetings are for your work, where 1 is not at
all worthwhile and 10 is extremely worthwhile.
a. Using the same scale, how worthwhile are these meetings for Atlantic salmon
management/recovery as a whole?
7. Again, on a scale of 1-10 how inclusive do you feel the [insert board(s) or action team] is
regarding your contributions? With 1 being extremely not inclusive and 10 being extremely
inclusive.
a. Do you perceive any barriers to your participation? Why or why not?
8. Within [insert action team, management board, or policy board], how are decisions made (i.e.,
consensus, majority, etc.)?
a.

Do you agree with the way decisions are made? [prompt] Why or why not?
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9. How are decisions, progress, and/or results made within your group communicated to the rest of
ASRF?
a. Is there anything you would like to see changed about the communication and
information flow within the ASRF?

[ask only if participant is a member of an action team]
10. Do you ever reach out to other action teams to work together on related issues? If so, what do you
reach out about?
11. What is the role of the management board in the ASRF?
a. Do you ever reach out to the management board for assistance in completing your action
teams responsibilities? If so, what do you reach out about?
12. What is the role of the policy board in the ASRF?
a. Do you ever reach out the policy board for assistance in completing your action team’s
responsibilities? If so, what do you reach out about?

[ask only if the participant is a member of the management board]
10. What is the role of the action teams in the ASRF?
a.

Do you ever reach out to action teams for assistance in completing your management
board responsibilities? When? Why?

11. What is the role of the policy board in the ASRF?
a. Do you ever reach out to the policy board for assistance in completing your management
board responsivities? When? Why?

90

[ask only if the participant is a member of the policy board]
10. What is the role of the action teams in the ASRF?
a. Do you ever reach out to the action teams for assistance in completing your policy board
responsibilities? When? Why?
11. What is the role of the management board in the ASRF?
a. Do you ever reach out to the management board for assistance in completing your policy
board responsibilities?

Organizational involvement/attitude toward ASRF
12. What is your sense of the organizational goals when the ASRF started and how, if at all, have
these changed over time?
13. To what extent do the goals of the ASRF goals align with your organization’s goals or priorities?
14. To what extent do other organizations (or individuals involved in the ASRF) share your view of
the ASRF? Where, if at all, are there differences in perspective about the ASRF?
15. Can you describe any boundaries or barriers that you see in the ASRF between organizations? In
your opinion do these boundaries or barriers create tension when working together, and if so,
how?

Broad questions about current and future management
16. In the online survey you completed, you rated the ASRF as being [insert response] as a
governance structure.
a. What do you think are the strengths of the ASRF?
b. What are the weaknesses of the ASRF? Do you have any suggestions on how to change
it?
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17. Given the current governance structure, the ASRF, in your opinion, what is the biggest barrier to
Atlantic salmon recovery in Maine?

Questions about the Maine Technical Advisory (TAC)
18. Were you involved in TAC? And in what capacity? (voting member? Advisory? Not a member
but familiar with operations, etc.)
[the following questions will only be asked if the participant responds ‘yes’ to question 18]
19. In your opinion, what were the strengths of TAC as a governance framework for Atlantic salmon
management?
20. In your opinion, what were the weaknesses of TAC?
21. Why do you think TAC dissolved?
22. Were you involved in salmon management during the years between the dissolution of TAC and
the formation of the ASRF? (roughly 3 years between 2007/8 and 2011 – checking these dates)
a. How were decisions made during that period?
b. During that time, do you feel that you had less communication with other organizations?
If yes, did that impact your ability to effectively manage Atlantic salmon?
23. On a scale of 1-10 how inclusive do you feel the TAC was regarding your contributions? With 1
being extremely not inclusive and 10 being extremely inclusive.
a. Did you perceive any barriers to your participation? Why or why not?
24. Do you think the role of different organizations or individual personalities played a bigger role in
determining the effectiveness of the TAC? If so, why?
25. On a scale of 1-10 please rate how effective the TAC was as a governance structure. 1 being
extremely ineffective and 10 being extremely effective.
26. Is there anything you thought we would talk about today that was not covered? Anything you
would like to add?
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